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Introduction  
After the corporate scandals affecting listed companies such as Enron, WorldCom or Parmalat 
improving corporate governance became an important issue and many changes have been in 
act during the years. The globalization but also the pressures from international organisms are 
leading towards the development of new principles of corporate governance. The codes of 
corporate governance are an important factor in governance practices. As Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) document there has been an increasing number of codes in the recent 
years and they also have improved the corporate governance of the countries that adopted 
them. Corporate governance codes are a set recommendations for best practices with regard to 
the structure and the functioning of the board of directors (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004).   
The independence criteria has become a central issue over the last decade  and many studies 
have reported that independent  directors constitute an important mechanism of corporate 
governance (Daily et al., 2003; Gordon, 2007; Kim et al., 2007; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). It 
is a commonly shared idea that increasing the proportion of independent members in the board 
of directors and its committees improves the corporate governance of the firm.  
The role of independent directors became important after the Sarbanes-Oxley act, which 
enforced the companies to increase the number of independent members in the board. 
Independence over the years, has also been the object of an increasing number of studies 
analyzing the role of independent members in mitigating the agency problems in the firm 
(Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al.,2003). Empirical findings have shown that 
independent directors on boards contribute in increasing firm performance (Dahya et al., 
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2008). Others documented the proportion of independent members in companies (Crespi and 
Pascal Fuster, 2013) .  
Independent directors are important in mitigating the agency problems arising as a result of the 
separation of ownership and control (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). In the European 
context, where most firms have  controlling shareholders, independent directors are important 
in protecting the minority shareholder from the risk of expropriation (Bebchuk and Hamdani, 
2009). Their particular role in mitigating both the agency problems arising in widely held 
firms but also in the controlling shareholder firms, has been recognized in the European 
Commission recommendation of 2005
1. The Commission’s report highlights the important 
role independent directors may play in improving corporate governance. 
 As a result of the increasing importance of the role of independent directors in improving the 
quality of corporate governance, in this study we focus our attention in the recommendations 
of the best practices of the European countries regarding the proportion of independent 
members on the board of directors and the audit committee.  In addition, we also analyze the 
independence of boards by verifying whether the division of duties between the CEO and 
Chairman is recommended by the best practices of European countries. The main objective is 
to analyze how the independence criteria is determined in the countries’ best practices. Doing 
so, we also verify if there are similarities or differences among the European countries in their 
definition of independence.  
We also develop a rigorous new measure of independence according to the recommendations 
of the SEC rules of corporate governance, the OECD principles of (2004), the EU 
                                                          
1
 Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the 
committees of the (supervisory) board.  
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Commission recommendations and the single countries best practices of corporate 
governance. Using our measure of independence, we gather firm level-statistics on the 
corporate governance practices on a sample of 463 European listed firms to analyze the degree 
of independence of the boards and the level of compliance of our sample with their respective 
country codes.  
In this study, we also measure the degree of compliance of our sample firms with the Anglo-
Saxon best practices of corporate governance at a country and a firm level. There has been an 
increasing debate during the years whether corporate governance mechanisms are converging 
towards the Anglo-Saxon best practices. The diffused idea that managers should act in the 
shareholders’ interests but also the failure of alternative models of corporate governance are 
some of the reasons that are driving the convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon best practices 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). In this study by analyzing the recommendations of the best 
practices in Europe but also the corporate governance mechanisms of the companies, we want 
to contribute to the existing debate on convergence by determining the degree of convergence 
of the European best practices with those of the Anglo-Saxon countries. To determine this, we 
use our measure of independence and analyze at a firm level, the proportion of independence 
of the companies’ board of directors and audit committee and also the division of duties 
between the CEO and Chairman. We then measure the level of compliance of the companies 
of the sample with the Anglo-Saxon best practices of corporate governance 
Analyzing the corporate governance codes of 17 European countries, we find differences 
regarding their recommendations on the proportion of independent members in the board. 
Most of the countries do not recommend a majority of independent members in the board of 
directors and the audit committee. The main difference in the recommendation of the best 
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practices is related to the independence criteria for which most of the definitions used are not 
similar among the governance codes. Countries use different definitions of independence and 
the main difference is related to the independence from the major shareholders. For some 
countries’ best practices being a shareholder representative does not influence the 
independence of a board member. According to the recommendations of the countries’ best 
practices regarding the independence criteria, we ranked the countries from the strongest to the 
weakest based on the quality of their governance. This allowed us to compare the results with 
La Porta et al’s (1999) ranking and so to validate our independence model.   
When analyzing firm-level corporate governance, we find that companies tend to follow their 
countries best practices regarding the proportion of independent members in the boards. We 
also observe a high degree of compliance of the companies with our measure of independence. 
Our findings also suggest that European countries corporate governance practices also comply 
with the Anglo-Saxon best practices of corporate governance. The result are interesting 
considering the fact that we use a stricter criteria of independence compared to the one 
suggested by the countries bests practices. We also find a high degree of companies having a 
fully independent audit committee. 
We also perform mean comparisons on the level of independence of the BOD, the audit 
committee and the CEO duality according to the legal regime (Common versus Civil law) as 
well as La Porta et al.,’s (1999) ranking of countries according to high and low anti-director 
rights.  
Finally, with regard to the discussion on convergence, we document a high degree of adoption 
of Anglo-Saxon principles of corporate governance in a firm-level basis. Our findings suggest 
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convergence is in act and this is more related to the companies’ corporate governance 
mechanisms than the best practices of the European countries. 
This study is structured as follows.  In the first section, we discuss the theoretical framework 
with a particular focus on the role of independent members in improving the corporate 
governance of a firm and their important role in mitigating the agency problems. Than follows 
the literature review and the description of the European corporate governance practices. In 
the third section, we discuss our sample selection and the independence criteria developed in 
this study. In section 4, we present the findings of our firm-level empirical analysis. We 
conclude in section 5 with the contributions, the limitations and future research perspectives. 
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Chapter I 
Theoretical framework 
1.1 Corporate governance and the codes of best practice recommendations 
After the corporate scandals, corporate governance has become an important item for 
researchers all over the world and the main debate has been how to increase its efficiency. 
Several reforms have been in act during the years with the main objective to improve the 
quality of corporate governance. According to Aguilera et al., (2011) the reason of all this 
important focus on corporate governance mechanisms, is connected to the increasing number 
of international investors and corporate scandals worldwide. The globalization of capital 
markets has given the opportunity to international investors to invest in different markets 
across the world. At this point, investors need an assurance for their investments and corporate 
governance may be important in providing this (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Investing in 
countries endowed with a weak corporate governance system is risky for the investors and this 
affects companies whose structures are not in line with the expectations of the international 
investors. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that, at the long run and as a result of the 
globalization, more efficient corporate governance mechanism will prevail, providing more 
protection for the investors and alleviating costs of external financing. 
On the other hand, corporate governance scandals have also affected the credibility of listed 
firm. Companies that respect the governance rules and apply the required governance 
mechanisms are also those that will have more opportunities to access different capital 
markets at lower costs. Because corporate governance is known to be an important factor for 
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the success of a company over the years, several efforts have been made to increase the 
efficiency of corporate governance. 
Particular instruments that have an important role in improving the corporate governance are 
the codes of best practice recommendations. The main objective of the codes is to reduce the 
differences between the companies adopted corporate governance systems and to harmonize 
the corporate governance system of all the companies of a particular country. These codes 
include several recommendations and guidelines on governance mechanisms for a company 
such as the board of directors and the management, its committees, mechanisms for electing 
the members of the board, decisions regarding their remuneration, etc. The codes of best 
practices, with the exception of the United States, are based on the comply or explain 
principle, which enforces the companies that are not complying with the principles to explain 
the reasons of non-compliance. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) suggest that for the year 2008, 64 countries all over the 
world had issued 196 distinct codes as a result of the importance that different organisms gave 
to these codes in improving the corporate governance. The codes, according to the authors, are 
issued as a result of different factors influencing the governance of firms such as the 
globalization and the integration of the financial markets, the increasing number of 
international investors and also the financial scandals. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) 
suggest that the codes are also released by different issuers such as governments, stock 
exchanges, investors, associations or other international organisms.  
However, differences in the scope and the roles that the codes of best practices have in 
improving corporate governance mechanisms still exist. Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) investigate 
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the reasons behind the wide diffusion of the codes by collecting the corporate governance 
codes worldwide for the year 2005. The authors find several differences in the diffusion, 
recommendations and the scope of the codes issued in civil and common law countries. Trying 
to explain the reasons for the adoption of the governance codes, the authors suggest that civil 
law countries also extend the recommendations of the codes to the non-listed firms. They 
suggest that civil law countries adopt the codes later and issue new codes to legitimize 
domestic companies in the global market rather than to improve corporate governance the of 
their country.  
1.2 Agency theory and the role of independent directors 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to raise the question whether managers being 
independent from shareholders, in the separation of ownership from control, act towards 
maximizing the value of the firm or pursue their own interests. According to their study, the 
creation of the quasi-public corporations through their increasing size, creates the separation 
of ownership and control, and results in a divergence of interests and incentives between the 
manager and the shareholders. 
Under the definition of Jensen and Meckling (1976), the firm is a set of contract with which 
the conflicts of interest of the two parties (management and shareholders) are brought into 
equilibrium. However, these contracts could not cover every single action of the different 
parties in the firm and so there are opportunities for agency problems to arise. They define the 
agency relationship as a contract in which the principal engages the agent to perform some 
duties on his behalf. In this sense in widely held companies, the principal is represented by the 
shareholders who give the decision making power to the manager (the agent) of the company. 
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According to the authors, if both parties are utility maximizers, the interests of the managers 
will not always be the same as the interests of the shareholders. This situation applies 
particularly to widely held companies, where there is a clear separation of ownership and 
control. Managers usually are more risk averse than the shareholders and also they may decide 
to expend less effort to the company than it is expected. As the risk and effort aversion of the 
managers are different from those of the shareholders, the decisions taken by management 
may not be the ones that maximize firm value, as shareholders expect from them. In this sense 
the main issue related to the separation of ownership and control, is the manager-shareholders’ 
divergence in interests leading to suboptimal decision making for the firm.  
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), when there is a separation of ownership and control, 
the managers end up with control rights on how to allocate the fund of the investors. 
According to them, even though managers and shareholders can sign different incentive 
contracts to regulate the behaviors of managers, not all contracts can control the managers’ 
decisions. This is explained by the fact that not all the future eventualities can be foreseen and 
the contracts are signed in advance. These contracts do not cover all the situations that may 
arise during the years and the financiers are not qualified or informed enough. In this situation 
managers have the control rights in advance and the discretion on how to allocate the funds 
provided by the financiers, thus, more possibilities for opportunism by the managers. 
Managers can expropriate the funds allocated by the investors by consuming the perquisites of 
the company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the managerial opportunism reduces the 
amount of resources that investors provide to the company as a result of the agency problems.  
The authors also point out different ways of expropriation from the managers. One form of 
expropriation is taking out the cash directly from the company or selling the outputs or the 
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assets to other companies they own. Managers may also consume perquisites or may focus in 
increasing the company size beyond the rational by reinvesting the free cash flows ( Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Their interests to increase the firm’s size beyond the rational is related to 
more power and resources under their control (Jensen, 1986).  
1.2.1 The agency costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that for the shareholders one way to limit the divergences 
is in engaging in costs that they define as agency costs. The agency costs are the costs that the 
shareholders bear to limit the risks of managerial opportunism.  These costs are mainly the 
monitoring costs, the bonding expenditures and the residual loss.  
The monitoring expenditures are costs related to the control of the activities of managers. 
These expenditures, according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) may be costs related to 
auditing, budget restrictions, control systems or establishing new compensation incentive to 
the managers in order alleviate the divergence of interests between them and the outsiders. 
The monitoring expenditures are costs that shareholders bear to make sure that the managers 
will pursue their interests. In this sense, shareholders who invest in monitoring expenditures 
will expect better returns on their investments as a result of the alignment of interests between 
the shareholders and the managers. However, the problem of engaging in monitoring activities 
in widely held firms is that no shareholder has the incentive to invest their own resources in 
monitoring the activities of the managers (Grossman and Hart, 1980). This can be explained 
by the fact that the shareholder will not gain all the benefits of investing in monitoring 
expenditures but will share them with other investors who will benefit from this without 
having to bear any of the monitoring costs. This phenomenon is called “free-riding” and, 
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because every shareholder thinks or “assumes” that someone else will be involved in 
monitoring and they will have the opportunity to “free-ride” at the expense of others, no 
shareholder will invest in these costs.  
The bonding expenditures are related with the guarantees that the managers tend to provide to 
the shareholders on following actions that are in line with their expectations. The bonding 
expenditures in this case is a cost that the manager will bear as an assurance to the 
shareholders that he will not engage in opportunism behaviors. Engaging in bonding costs 
gives to the agent the possibility to use the resources provided by the principal. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) suggest that bonding expenditures may be related to the engagement to audit 
the financial statements by an external auditor. Other bonding expenditures according to the 
authors may be the decision of the manager to limit his decision power or a guarantee that he 
will not be engaged in activities that reduce the outsiders’ wealth. 
The residual loss is related to the divergences that still exist between the shareholders and the 
managers and that are not alleviated by the monitoring and the bonding activities. As it is 
impossible to prevent, ex-ante, all the behaviors of the managers, problems related to the 
alignment of interests will still persist after the monitoring and the bonding costs.  
1.2.2 Types of agency conflicts 
In widely held companies, as a result of the separation of the ownership and control, the 
decisions are made from the managers who are delegated by the shareholders to run the firm. 
Managers risk and effort aversion is different from the shareholders, hence, the incentives that 
they have in making decisions may not always be in line with what the shareholders expect. 
As a result of the diversities of the motivations between the two groups, different agency 
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conflicts may arise in the firm. The literature have shown that these conflicts of interests may 
be classified into four different types (Byrd, Parrino, and Pritsch, 1998) 
1.2.2.1 The effort problem 
The effort problem is related to the dedication that the managers put in the firm to create value 
for the stakeholders. Managers are the controllers but not the owners of the firm, and in this 
sense their incentives to work and so to maximize the value of the firm may differ from what 
the shareholders would expect. This is a moral-hazard problem that refers to the lack of effort 
that the managers put in the firm to pursue the objectives of the shareholders (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
The management incentives to shirk will depend on their ownership on the firm (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The authors demonstrate that when a firm is wholly owned by the manager, 
he will have incentives to maximize his utility and in this case these incentives are also related 
to the firm value maximization. As the ownership of the manager decreases, his incentives to 
shirk will increase as a result of the agency cost created by the divergence between the 
interests of the manager and the outside shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
the incentive of the manager to invest in new creative activities will depend on his ownership 
of the firm, and as this ownership decreases, so does  his incentives  resulting in a significant 
reduction of the firm’s value. 
The findings of Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) are in line with this theoretical argumentation. 
The authors analyze the announcements in which one director joins the board of another 
company and find that the value of the firms declines significantly after the announcement. 
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These findings suggest that an increase in the duties of the directors may decrease their efforts 
and devotion in a given firm.  
1.2.2.2 Horizon problem 
The corporation is expected to have an infinite life and in this perspective, another diversity of 
interests arises between the shareholders and the managers. Shareholders are concerned on the 
value of the firm for its entire continuous life   which contrasts with the managers who are 
only concerned  on the cash flows during their employment period (Byrd et al., 1998). As a 
result of this divergence of interest, the projects that the managers will choose for their 
investments may not be in line with the projects that the shareholders would choose if they 
were also managers. Because of the horizon problem, managers may be more interested in 
projects that generate high accounting returns in the short-term instead of choosing long-term 
investments with a positive Net Present Value (McColgan, 2001). Accordingly, what the 
managers will only take into consideration the cash flows produced during their period of 
employment in the firm and not focuses on value-enhancing investments that will generate 
returns on a long term period after their employment with the firm. 
This problem, according to Dechow and Sloan (1991), becomes more relevant when the 
managers are about to retire or to leave the company. In these situations, managers prefer to 
invest in short term projects with quick results instead of focusing on long term projects that 
may generate more profits. The authors found that the R&D expenditures tend to decline as 
the managers approach their retirement, and they suggest that the reason for this decline is 
related to the time horizon problem. A firm investing in R&D expenditures may reduce the 
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manager’s compensation in the short term period and so, the managers that are about to retire 
may be reluctant to these investments before their retirement.  
Byrd et al., (1998) suggest that the horizon problem may also be relevant in the case where the 
equity market does not recognize in a short term basis, the true long term value of a new 
project for the firm. A manager who is worried about these short term market reactions may be 
more willing to choose investments that produce high cash flows in the short term instead 
investment with high positive net present values in the long term. 
1.2.2.3 The asset problem 
Managers may also engage in an inappropriate use of the firm’s assets for their personal 
interests. Because the managers do not bear the entire costs of these expenditures, they may 
have incentives to misuse the company assets. The agency problem arises because the 
shareholders are those who bear almost all the costs related to the asset consumption problem 
which ultimately becomes value destructive destroys value for the firm and for them.  
According to Jensen (1986),  managers have incentives to push their firms to grow because 
they benefit from these growth opportunities by increasing their power and the resources 
under their control. The author also suggest that another reason why managers tend to cause 
their firm to grow is because the size of the firm has an impact on their remuneration which 
tend to increase as the firm grows in size (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Jensen (1986) suggests that according to the free cash flows of the firm, new divergences of 
interests between managers and shareholders may arise. In fact, while shareholders prefer to 
have the free cash flows of a firm distributed to them once all value enhancing investments are 
made, managers tend to retain the excess cash flows and undertake suboptimal investment 
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decisions that will result in an increase in firm size and, consequently,  increase managers’ 
power of control, prestige, and remuneration.  
1.2.2.4 Risk sharing  
Another agency problem that arises as a result of the divergence between managers and 
shareholders is the risk sharing. The risk sharing problem is related to the fact that the two 
parties have different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). Shareholders should diversify 
their firm-specific risk they can do so and also at a low cost. As the shareholder may diversify 
their specific risk at a low cost, they are less risk averse than the managers who are more risk 
averse because they have fully invested their human capital in the firm and hence are not 
diversified. Most of the managers’ wealth depends on the success of the firm and its survival. 
Byrd et al., (1998) argue that when the managerial compensation is composed of a fixed salary 
and their skills are difficult to transfer from one firm to another, their risk preferences will 
differ from those of the shareholders. Risk increasing investment decision from the managers 
may also increase the probabilities of bankruptcy which will increase the risk of the managers’ 
loss of remuneration and reputation. This will make it more difficult for managers to find 
another job of same remuneration (McColgan, 2001).  
The manager’s risk preferences will also be reflected in their policies to reduce the risks in 
which the firm is subjected to. Instead of choosing new products or new technologies, 
managers may choose a less risky investment such as expanding an existing product, and 
hence limiting the possibilities of failure (Byrd et al., 1998). From one point of view, this 
choice reduces the risks for the managers but may also reduce the shareholders’ wealth from 
not investing in more profitable but riskier new projects. 
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As  Jensen (1986)  points out, managers’ risk aversion may also influence their financial 
policies. In fact managers who are risk averse will prefer to use debt as little as possible for the 
financing of their investments because of the high risk of bankruptcy associated with debt. 
They may also choose to finance their investments by shares with low dividend payouts to 
avoid debt. However, debt will reduce the agency costs related to the free cash flows available 
for the managers who will consequently have less discretion for overinvesting and for serving 
their own interests ( Jensen, 1986). 
1.2.3 Mechanisms for controlling the agency problems 
The main agency issue that arises as a result of the separation of ownership and control is 
related to the alignment problem. The interest of the shareholders and the managers may not 
be aligned because of the different incentives of these two parties. To address these problems, 
widely held firms can rely on various governance mechanisms created to alleviate alignment 
related agency costs. Accordingly, the main objective of governance mechanisms is to develop 
new ways to mitigate the agency problems and so to increase the alignment of interests 
between the shareholders and the managers. The literature categorizes corporate governance 
mechanisms as external and internal mechanisms depending on the parties that are involved in 
the monitoring of managers, whether directly from governing directors or indirectly through 
market forces outside the firm. Hence, external mechanisms may be such as the market for 
corporate control, market for managers and the financial policy of the firm. Inside mechanisms 
are related to the mechanisms inside the firm that monitor the managers such as the board of 
directors and the remuneration policy of the firm. 
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1.2.3.1 The market for managers   
The market for managers may be an important factor in reducing the agency costs related to 
the alignment issues by encouraging managers to increase their performance and 
consequently, align their interests with those of the shareholders. Managers tend to have more 
opportunities if they obtain good results and are effective. According to their performance in 
creating value for the firm, the market for managers will pressure the firms’ compensations 
policies. This can be a positive incentive for the efficiency of managers because of the 
potential high remuneration opportunities and possibilities to be hired as board members in 
alternative firms of larger size. According to Fama (1980),  managers ‘remuneration will 
depend on their success or failure to create value for the firm. Based on corporate performance 
and how well the managers are able to align their interests with those of shareholders, the 
market for managers will signal the required level of remuneration to offer to managers. In 
fact he argues that the market for managers puts pressure on the firm’s wages to compensate 
the managers according to their performance. This will also allow the alignment of incentives 
between managers and  shareholders as the managers will be more focused optimizing  
corporate so to signal the information on their skills and performance be signaled  to the 
markets. Fama (1980) also points out that the firm is more able to evaluate the managers 
according to their past performances and so, when the firm is searching for a new manager, a 
good way to determine their abilities is by measuring their performance. This is also helpful 
for the managers because when their firm compensation system does not correspond to the 
level the managers deserve, they have the possibility to change firm and so to find a job that 
pays them the salary they are worth receiving. 
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In line with Fama’s (1980) arguments, Gilson (1989) found that the market for managers uses 
past information regarding the performance of managers in the firm, when determining the 
wages and other job opportunities for the managers. . Using a sample of US listed firms, he 
found that managers who resign from financially distressed firms, are not employed by other 
listed firms for at least 3 year after their resignation. He also finds that when the managerial 
costs of financial distress are high, managers tend to limit their default probabilities by 
choosing less risky investments, less borrowing or more management efficiency. 
1.2.3.2 The market for corporate control 
Takeovers contribute in mitigating the agency problems when the internal control mechanisms 
are non efficient ( Jensen, 1986). He argues that the market will reflect the agency problems of 
the firms. Hence, investors will catch these signals and will pay less for the shares of the 
company which will result in a decrease of the price of shares. Managers are underperforming 
as a result of the agency problems and they are using the resources under their control for their 
own interests. In this case, investors who realize that they can do better and increase the 
performance of the firm and consequently its value, become potential bidders.  
Consistent with these arguments are the findings of Healy et al., (1992). These authors analyze 
the performance of a sample of US firms after their mergers and find that the corporate 
performance of the firms has increased after the mergers suggesting that takeovers may play 
an important role in pushing managers to perform better and increase firm value. 
Martin and McConnell (1991) suggest that an important role of the takeovers is to discipline 
the managers of underperforming firms. The authors argue that the takeover may serve as a 
threat for the actual managers of a firm to perform better and to focus more on value 
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maximizing activities. In fact, the potential bidders will monitor the performance of the 
managers of target firms.  Hence, the managers being in the risk of losing their position if their 
firm becomes a potential target, may be more concerned in aligning their interests with those 
of the shareholders and focusing on maximizing  the value of the firm. 
1.2.3.3 Financial policy 
The agency problems and hence the agency costs may also depend on the financial policy of 
the firm. How the firms decide their financial policy may contribute to the alignment of 
interests between the managers and shareholders. The high risk of bankruptcy associated to 
debt financing may lower the agency problems of the firms. Also the fact that managers are 
evaluated according to their performance may push them to align their interests with those of 
the shareholders, to be more focused on firm efficiency and to produce value for the firm. 
Debt financing is considered a corporate governance mechanism that plays an important part 
in mitigating the agency problems of a firm. Debt holders monitor managers by setting 
covenants on required corporate performance and financial situation and also by evaluating the 
investment activities that they are financing. This monitoring will lead managers to be more 
concerned in making value-enhancing investment decisions, and therefore limit the agency 
costs which arise from the non efficient use of the free cash flows. Debt financing limits the 
opportunity of managers to make misuse of the resources they control.  
 Jensen (1986) described the important role of debt in reducing the agency costs of the firm 
and also the benefits of debt in motivating the managers and the organizations to be more 
efficient. He argues that in firms with substantial free cash flows, managers have the control 
on how to use these cash flows. The substantial cash flows may be misused by managers in 
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investing in low return investments or increase the firm size so to increase their power and 
their remuneration. The agency problem arises as a result of the decision of the manager to use 
the cash flows for their interests instead of choosing to pay out the cash. Debt financing will 
limit the resources under the control of managers as creditors will monitor their activities. 
Creditors will follow the investment opportunities and the company will not invest in low 
value projects. From the monitoring activity of the debt financing, managers will be enforced 
to reimburse the free cash flows.  
When debt levels are high and profits are low, cash flows will be associated to negative ratings 
from the rating agencies and this will push the shareholders to substitute the managers for their 
poor performance (Byrd et al., 1998). 
1.2.3.4 Investor protection 
Investor protection deals with the mechanisms by which the corporate laws offer a protection 
to corporate investors. As the investors are investing in the firm, they also need an assurance 
of obtaining a return on their investments. Without this mechanism of legal investor 
protection, investors face the risk of expropriation from managers or large blockholders, they 
may decide not to provide financing for the firm. La Porta et al., (2000) suggest that as 
investor protection increases, the insiders being themselves either managers or major 
shareholders, have less opportunities to expropriate the minority shareholders, or so their 
interests will be aligned. When the investor protection mechanism is strongly enforced, 
insiders will expropriate less and hence, their private benefits of control will diminish. The 
authors suggest that a good investor protection is offered by both, legal laws and their 
enforcement. They suggest that some of the rights of the investors generally protected by laws 
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or regulation may include the shareholder rights to receive dividends on pro-rata terms, to vote 
for the directors, to sue directors or major shareholders for suspected expropriation etc. For the 
creditors, they suggest that these rights deal with bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, 
and may include mechanisms that enable creditors to repossess collateral or protect their 
seniority etc. 
In countries where there is a weak investor protection, the risk of expropriation of the minority 
shareholders is high. According to La Porta et al ., (1998) (1997), countries with weak investor 
protection are also those that have more controlling shareholder structures. In response to the 
weak investor protection concentrated ownership is important to limit the risk of 
expropriation.  On the other hand, widely held companies are more common in countries with 
strong shareholder protection which can be explained by the fact that strong legal protection 
mechanisms which limit the risks of expropriation for the minority shareholders are strong in 
these countries. In fact, Leuz et al., (2003) find that strong and enforced outsider rights limit 
the insiders’ behaviors for private control benefits and so the insiders have less opportunities 
to manage earnings.  
1.2.3.5 Remuneration 
Until now, we described the mechanisms that tend to alleviate the agency problems that are 
related to parties outside the firm. These are mechanisms that align the interests of the 
outsiders being themselves shareholders or other stakeholders with the managers inside the 
firm. The remuneration policy is especially important in firms where the managers make 
decisions that cannot be monitored by the board of directors or the investors (Byrd et al., 
1998). The remuneration policy depends on the decision of the parties inside the firm, being 
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themselves managers or other parties involved in the management of the firm such as the 
board of directors and its committees, which decide the remuneration for the managers so as to 
align their interests with those of the shareholders. The remuneration policies may represent a 
high incentive for the manager of the company to do well. An efficient remuneration policy 
will provide the necessary incentive for managers to increase their efforts to do well and will 
therefore mitigate agency problems.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that higher levels of 
compensation for the managers will lead to higher company performance and consequently to 
lower levels of agency costs. 
The remuneration policy is composed of three components; salary, accounting-based bonuses 
and executive stock options. 
The salary is structured in a way to provide managers the incentives they need to focus on 
increasing the performance of the firm. Usually the salary is determined by the market for 
managers and also depends on other factors such as the size of the firm or the duties of the 
manager. Salary can be used to reward the managers according to their performance and push 
them to increase their incentives towards maximizing firm value (Byrd et al., 1998). 
Baker et al., (1988) suggest that compensation plans based on the performance are effective 
and able to incentivize employees to do exactly what they are told to do. However, the authors 
also underline some limits of the performance-based compensation in motivating the 
employees. They suggest that the monetary awards in some cases may be counterproductive in 
that they can lower the employee motivation by reducing the intrinsic rewards associated to 
their performance in the firm. They also argue that the performance-based compensation may 
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affect the employee morale and productivity because of the different treatment of the 
employees based on their performance.  
The accounting-based compensations are incentive schemes under which the performances of 
the manager are compensated according to accounting measures and the remuneration of the 
managers may be in stocks and cash. Accounting-based compensations may play an important 
role in aligning the shareholders and managers incentives. This assumption is supported by 
Banker et al., (1996) who find that the implementation of these plans is associated with an 
increase in sales, which persists over time. The authors analyze 15 retail outlets and find that 
when managers are compensated according to their performance, the output increases. 
Another important aspect of the accounting-based compensation plans is that these plans can 
also be designed to reward the performance in division levels. Accordingly, these plans can 
incentivize lower-level managers to increase the value of the firm as well (Byrd et al., 1998). 
However, Byrd et al., (1998) suggest that although these plans may help align the interests 
between the managers and the shareholders, many problems are related to them. The 
accounting numbers may be subject to manipulation by the managers to increase their 
performance in order to obtain their bonuses.  
Executive stock options are used as market based compensation that also plays an important 
role in aligning the manager and shareholders’ interests. Under the stock option compensation, 
managers have the rights to buy or receive company stocks as compensation, and so become 
part owners of the company they manage. This mechanism help mitigate the agency problems  
because managers having become shareholders have the same incentives as the other 
shareholders in increasing firm value so also maximizing their wealth as a result of the 
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increased value of the stocks they own. Stock options may also be long term incentive plans 
motivating managers to focus on long term value maximization for the firm and not only for 
the period of their employment. Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) suggest that executive stock 
options help mitigate agency problems thus align the interests between the managers and 
shareholders. They also suggest that stock options will push the managers towards choosing 
the best investments that increases the firm value. Mehran (1995) also found that firm 
performance is related to the stock options held by managers, discussing the important role 
that these compensation plans have in mitigating agency problems. He found that these plans 
are especially used in firms with more outside directors. Firm with large shareholders or 
insiders owning a large percentage of the shares, tend to use less equity-based compensations.  
These findings suggest these types of compensations may be effective in limiting the agency 
costs in widely held companies but not in companies with controlling shareholders who have 
the right incentives to monitor managers. 
1.2.3.6 The board of directors 
Another important mechanism in aligning managers’ and shareholders’ interests is the board 
of directors. The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company and its 
main issue is determining the future strategies of the company. The members of the board of 
directors are elected by the shareholders and as they are delegated with all the powers to 
manage the firm, it is expected that they will act in their best interests. The shareholders have 
the rights to appoint the directors of the company, to choose the auditing company and to 
approve new stock issues. However, all the other powers such as the management and control 
functions of the firm are delegated to the board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The 
board of directors, on its end, delegates powers to other agents which are under the control of 
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the board. To increase the efficiency of the board, the board of directors is assisted in its 
decision making process by other sub-committees such as the nomination, remuneration and 
audit committees. These committees, being part of the board, have the function to assist the 
board in the nomination of new board members, in solving issues related to the company 
finances or in making decisions on the remuneration policies of the company.  
The role of the board of directors in mitigating agency problems has been subject of several 
debates. As the directors are elected by the shareholders, they may not be able to monitor all 
the activities of the directors.  One possible way for the shareholders to oversee the managers 
is by electing independent directors. Independent directors are seen as an important 
mechanism in controlling the insiders and protecting the shareholder’s interests. 
Independent directors 
The board of directors is composed by inside and outside directors. Insiders are the people 
who are linked to the management of the company and in some cases, who also have 
connections with other shareholders either by being their representatives or being elected by 
them to oversee the interests of the large shareholders of the company. In this case, agency 
problems may arise linked to the fact that these insiders have their interests aligned with the 
managers or the major shareholders. On the other hand, the independent directors being 
outsiders and being unlinked with other stakeholders of the company, have an important role 
in controlling the managers and the other executive members.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that independent directors are more incentivized to align their 
interests with those of the shareholders than with the insiders. They point out that outside 
directors have to keep good reputations for themselves as decision experts because of the 
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market for independent members. As they may also be members of other corporations, their 
value will strongly depend on their past performances and their ability to play an important 
role as referees between the insiders and the shareholders. The motivation of having 
independent members in the board is the need for greater transparency, accountability and 
efficiency of the corporate governance mechanisms (Aguilera, 2005).   
It is a commonly shared opinion that the independent directors play an important role in 
effective corporate governance. Usually, their presence in the boards is seen as a good 
mechanism of governance from the investors, because of the role that independent directors 
play in controlling the managers. The presence of independent members in the board is seen as 
a good principle of corporate governance in many studies  (Daily et al, 2003; Gordon, 2007; 
Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). According to Bebchuk and Hamdani, (2009), independent 
directors are important in both controlling and non-controlling shareholder companies. The 
authors point out that the role of independent directors is to protect the interests of 
shareholders from management opportunism, in the case of non-controlling shareholder 
companies. For the controlling shareholder firms, the presence of independent directors is 
important in assuring protection for the minority shareholders’ interests. In this case, 
independent directors may limit the risk of expropriation of the minority shareholders from the 
major shareholders. Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) analyze the corporate governance codes 
worldwide and find that the independent non-executive directors’ recommendations are 
commonly shared among all the governance practices. They also find that measures to 
mitigate the agency problems are also commonly adopted as measure in the codes worldwide.  
Different studies document the important role of the independent members in aligning the 
managers with the shareholders’ interests. Studies in the US (Xie., 2003; Klein, 2002;) and 
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Europe (Benkraiem, 2011; Peasnell et al.,2005) find that the presence of independent directors 
is negatively related with earnings management, suggesting that independent directors do 
mitigate the agency problems. 
However, in regards to the role of independent directors on firm performance, studies have 
been controversial and inconclusive. In fact, Bhagat and Black (1999) do not find any relation 
between the presence of independent members in the board and  firm performance. 
Finally, there is a clear relation between independent directors and the county’s minority 
shareholder rights. Kim et al., (2007) analyzing a sample of firms for 14 European countries, 
found that when the minority shareholder’s rights are strong, there is a significant presence of 
independent members in the board suggesting that in these countries, the minority 
shareholders have more legal power to affect the board of directors and so to nominate more 
independent members. They suggest that for these countries, the minority shareholder law and 
board independence are complements for the effective governance of firms. 
CEO independence 
CEO independence deals with the idea of the CEO also occupying the role of Chairman of the 
board of directors. It is expected that CEOs that are also Chairmen of the board of directors 
have more power to control their decisions thus increasing the agency problems in firms. By 
appointing the board of directors, the shareholders control the activities of the CEO. However, 
when the CEO has more power on the board, it will be difficult to control him or even 
substitute him when he underperforms. As a senior manager, the CEO may have different 
incentives to pursue his or her own incentives instead of focusing on maximizing the firm’s 
value. According to Weisbach (1988), it is difficult to substitute the CEO in case of poor past 
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performance when the board of directors is composed of a majority of insiders. Instead, the 
authors suggest that when the board is dominated by outsiders, they observe more CEO 
turnover as a result of poor past performance. The author suggests that the CEO being also an 
insider, may have the same interests as those of the other insiders in the board of directors at 
the expense of the shareholders.  
Dechow et al.,(1996) found that firms manipulating earnings are more likely to have the CEO 
serving also as Chairman of the board.  They suggest that the CEO may use his power on the 
board of directors, for his own interests, thus increasing his wealth at the shareholder’s 
expense. 
1.2.4 Controlling shareholder companies and agency relationship 
To this point, we only described one type of agency problem arising between shareholders and 
managers in the case of the separation of ownership and control. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
name this as agency problem as being of Type 1. The agency relationship that we described 
above arises in firms where there is no controlling shareholder. In these firms, the agency 
relationship is between the managers and the shareholders that cannot control the management 
opportunistic behaviors. However, the literature has shown that with the exception of the 
United States and the UK,  most other countries have a prevalence of controlling shareholders 
firms (Enriques and Volpin, 2007; La Porta et al., 1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Claessens et 
al., 2000).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that in countries where the legal protection of the minority 
investors is weak, one way for the minority shareholders to limit the agency problems is to 
become large enough in order  to get more effective control of the company and protect their 
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interests. They suggest that becoming a large shareholder gives the investor more incentives to 
control the manager and also to collect the information needed for this control. In the case of a 
widely held company, the shareholders will face the free-rider problem. The shareholders will 
not have the incentives to control the manager thinking that someone else will do the 
monitoring. This will give the managers enough power to exproriate the shareholders and 
pursue their own interests. In firms with a  large shareholder, this will occur less because the 
benefits that the large shareholder will gain from the monitoring activity exceed its costs ( 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). From one point of view, the controlling shareholders, as a 
consequence of their important investment in the firm, have both the power and also the 
incentives to control  management opportunism and  to make sure that there is an  alignment 
of interest between the two categories (R. Gilson, 2006). Large shareholders have the 
incentives to maximize the value of the firm, which corresponds to the expectations of all 
other groups of stakeholders in the firm. They also have the possibility to force the managers 
to behave according to their expectations or change them through  proxy fights or after a 
takeover (Claessens et al., 2002). In this case, the controlling shareholders will contribute in 
mitigating the agency costs that arise between the different incentives of managers and 
shareholders.  
However, not all the interests of the large shareholders may be in line with those of minority 
shareholders (Enriques and Volpin, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The opportunism of the 
large shareholders may push them to act in a way that is contrary to the expectations of the 
minority shareholders. Villalonga and Amit (2006) mane this agency problem as Type 2 where 
the main agency issue is related to the entrenchment of large shareholders. Although the large 
shareholders help mitigate the Type 1  agency problem,  the new agency problem is related to 
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the unlimited power the controlling shareholders have and the possibility to expropriate 
private benefits of control from the minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997). Large shareholders may have the power and the incentives to control the 
managers and to limit the agency costs of managerial opportunisms, but on the other hand, 
they may be large enough to expropriate the minority shareholders.  Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) indicate different ways in which the large shareholders may expropriate the minority 
shareholders. Thus, if their control rights are in excess of their cash flow rights, they may try 
to treat themselves in a preferential way at the expense of other investors. Thus, they point out 
that when shareholders have control rights in excess of voting rights, they may choose not to 
pay out cash flows to the other investors but rather pay themselves only. Another opportunistic 
behavior from the large shareholders is the possibility to transfer wealth to other companies 
controlled by them or to undertake projects that do not maximize the value of minority 
shareholders. In the case of pyramid controlling minority structures, the dominant 
shareholders may also choose projects that do not maximize the value of the firm. Finally, 
large shareholders also have the possibility to nominate insiders that will protect their interests 
and may act differently than from what the minority shareholders expect.  
1.2.4.1 Agency theory for CMS firms 
Bebchuk et al., (2000) describe other agency costs that may arise in companies where there is 
a difference between the level of voting and the cash flow rights held by a controlling 
shareholder. The authors call these structures “controlling minority structures” (CMS) because 
they describe common arrangements that enable the controlling shareholders to maintain the 
control of the company without necessary holding a majority of cash flow rights. This 
separation of voting rights from the cash flow rights occurs in three ways; by the creation of 
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dual class voting rights, by stock pyramids and by cross ownership. Using these mechanisms 
to control the company by retaining only a small fraction of cash flow rights, the controlling 
minority shareholders have different ways to expropriate wealth form the company related to 
the investment project they choose, the scope of the firm and the transfer of control. They 
show that as the amount of cash flow rights held by the controlling minority shareholder 
declines, the agency costs of these firms increase at a very progressive rate. The authors argue 
that these agency costs may be limited by two factors that serve as constraints to the 
controlling minority shareholder: the bad reputation of a controlling minority structure and the 
legal protections to the minority shareholders. The authors also suggest that the controlling 
minority structures are common in countries outside the US. According to them, countries 
with weak shareholder protection where the legal rules are lax and the private benefits of 
control are large, are those that have more controlling minority structures. 
1.3 Harmonization or convergence? 
In the recent years much attention is focused on improving the corporate governance 
mechanisms in Europe. International organisms but also the European commission are pushing 
towards the harmonization of corporate governance mechanisms with the main objective to 
mitigate the agency problems. The creation of a unique capital market in Europe brings the 
need to harmonize the corporate governance mechanisms for all the countries. This in turn will 
make ensure that corporate governance best practices are comparable and accepted worldwide 
to mitigate the agency problems.  
The convergence of the corporate governance has gained particular attention from the scholars 
during the years. The integration of capital markets, the product markets but also the 
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increasing number of new codes of governance are some of the factors driving the 
convergence of corporate governance (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). The authors suggest 
that competitiveness, the increasing number of cross-country listed firms as well as 
international investors are reasons for convergence.  
Convergence of corporate governance across countries has been subject of several debates and 
research questions during the years. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) predict that the 
convergence of the corporate governance mechanisms of the countries worldwide will lead 
towards a more shareholder oriented mechanism such as that of Anglo-Saxon countries. 
According to the authors, the failure of the other existing models and the wide consensus that 
managers should act towards maximizing the shareholders’ interests will increase the 
convergence of the corporate governance worldwide.  
However, Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) suggest that despite the different studies proposing 
convergence of the governance mechanisms among different countries, there is still limited 
evidence  that such convergence is actually occurring.  
Of particular interest for some studies is to determine what actually means convergence.  
Gilson (2001) makes a distinction between convergence in form and convergence in function. 
According to him convergence in form is related to increasing the similarities in the national 
laws and institutions among countries and allowing for different countries to adopt the same 
legal framework. Convergence in function means that different countries may use different 
legal frameworks or institutions but may still perform well in the same way with other 
countries having different legal frameworks. 
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Khanna et al., (2006) distinguish between de jure and de facto convergence. According to the 
authors de jure convergence is when different countries adopt similar corporate governance 
laws and on the other side if these actual practices are converging we have a de facto 
convergence. To simplify, countries may adopt same rules of governance from other countries 
and this is de jure convergence but how these practices are actually enforced or implemented 
in the principles of the national codes of the different countries is related to the de facto 
convergence. 
However, different studies point out the difficulties in increasing the convergence of 
governance practices among countries (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999; Coffee, 1999; Gilson, 2001). 
For different reasons related to the ownership structure of the firms, countries’ national laws, 
countries’ culture and also the costs that request the several improvements or changes in 
corporate governance, it is difficult to predict the convergence of the national governance 
mechanisms (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). 
In this study we analyze the European best practices guidelines to measure the level of 
harmonization of the best practices and also if there is any tendency of convergence. The main 
objective is to measure the impact of the recommendations of the European commission, 
international organisms and the new codes of best practices issued in Europe on the 
harmonization of European corporate governance practices. We do this by analyzing the 
corporate governance best practices of 17 European countries and in particular their 
recommendations regarding the independence criteria. We then analyze firm level corporate 
governance for a sample of 463 European listed companies to see how the companies comply 
with their respective country codes and how these codes are actually enforced by these firms. 
Using a definition of independence developed in this study we also measure the level of 
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convergence of the European best practices with the Anglo-Saxon principles of corporate 
governance.  We measure the convergence with the Anglo-Saxon best practices by analyzing 
the level of compliance for the companies of the sample with the Anglo-Saxon best practices. 
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Chapter II 
Literature review 
2.1 European corporate governance practices 
According to Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), in the recent years the number of new 
codes issued by countries all over the world has increased significantly. They also suggest that 
the country level adoption of these best practices has improved corporate governance. 
International organisms such as World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) play an important role on the development of new practices of 
corporate governance. The OECD principles of corporate governance (1999) served as 
guidelines for the OECD and non-OECD countries in the development of new codes. Taking 
into account the corporate scandals that followed, the OECD (2004) published the revised 
version of these principles with the main objective “to strengthen the fabric of corporate 
governance around the world in the years ahead”. These developments also affected the 
European countries.  As a response to the globalization, the integration of capital markets and 
the increasing competitiveness of businesses, the EU Commission developed new principles in 
line with the best practices commonly accepted all over the world. The Action Plan was a first 
move on modernizing the corporate governance practices for European companies (EU, 2003). 
The main objective of the plan was to encourage the member countries to adopt the best 
practices suggested by the Commission when issuing new governance codes. These best 
practices are related to the enhancement of the governance disclosure requirements, the 
strengthening of shareholder’s rights and the protection of the creditors, increasing the role of 
independent non-executive directors. The Commission suggests that promoting a unique 
corporate governance code for all the countries of the union is not necessary and there is no 
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need to do so. Instead, reducing the barriers that determine divergences of corporate 
governance practices among the European countries allows companies to operate cross-border 
and integrate in the European market. In the Action Plan there is a commonly shared idea that 
the comply or explain principle of the United Kingdom’s Cadbury Report (MacNeil and Li, 
2006) is better than the enforced law of the Sarbanes-Oxley act. Another important priority 
that was set, was the creation of the European Corporate Governance Forum with the main 
objective to promote the co-ordination and convergence of the national codes. However, as 
suggested in the Global Corporate Governance Forum report of (2008), the actual work of the 
forum is on promoting and developing new best practices on corporate governance that take 
into account the differences in the laws, culture and market structure among the European 
countries. Hermes et al.,(2006) analyze the degree of adoption of the European 
recommendations (EU, 2003) using the corporate governance codes of the European countries. 
The authors did not find any convergence of the national codes with the EU recommendations. 
Moreover, they found that the codes of best practices for the European countries are not in full 
accordance with the priorities set by the EU Commission. They suggest that the codes of best 
practices are not driven only by external forces but also by domestic forces, which makes the 
full adoption of the EU recommendations difficult. 
It seems that there is a global trend in improving corporate governance, especially after the 
Sarbanes-Oxley act and the debate among the scholars on whether or not the new governance 
practices in Europe are pushing towards the Anglo-Saxon best practices of corporate 
governance. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) suggest that there is some convergence 
towards the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance while Bauer et al. (2008) observe 
that large European listed firms are moving towards more shareholder - oriented practices. 
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According to them, these standards are to be found in the United States (US) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) models of corporate governance. In fact, the adoption of these practices comes 
as a need in response to increasing governance quality when cross-listed in international 
exchanges or the need to adopt practices that are widely accepted by the international 
investors. Also, the actions taken by the Commission to strengthen the internal corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the recommendation (2005/162/EC) and the directive 
(2006/43/EC) seem a progress towards adopting Anglo-Saxon best practices. 
However, many problems affect the corporate governance mechanisms in the European 
countries. As Enriques and Volpin (2007) point out, the ownership structure of the European 
companies is different from that of united states and the UK. They find that in Europe only a 
few companies are widely held as opposed to the Anglo-Saxon countries. According to their 
study, the conflict of interests in the European companies is between the large shareholders 
and the minority shareholders with the risk for the minority shareholders to be expropriated by 
the major shareholders.  
In this study, we analyze the European corporate governance code recommendations related to 
the structure of the board of directors and the audit committee. As noted by Zattoni and 
Cuomo (2010), the corporate governance codes are a set of best practice recommendations 
related to the structure and the functioning of  governance mechanisms.  For Europe, the best 
practices are not rigid rules and are based on the comply or explain principle by which the 
companies that do not comply with the recommendations of the code should explain the 
reasons of non-compliance. For reasons related to the diversities that still exist between the 
European countries, the choice of the regulators is not to enforce the companies in adopting 
the best practices. However the market pressure for compliance and the fact that these best 
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practices are also recommended by the listing rules, increases the degree of adoption from the 
companies (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2004).  
Best practices in Europe differ among countries in their recommendations.  Of particular 
interest are the differences related to the board of director’s structure and composition. 
Countries such as Germany, Austria or Netherland have the two-tier model predominant for 
their board structure which is different from the unitary model that derives from the Anglo-
Saxon model of corporate governance and is adopted widely all over the world. In the two-tier 
model the supervisory board is responsible for the supervision while the management board is 
responsible for the management of the company. In the two-tier model of corporate 
governance both members of the management but also of the supervisory board are elected 
from the shareholders. The supervisory board in the two-tier model, according to the German 
best practices (2010), has its main responsibilities to advise and supervise the members of the 
board of Management. The Supervisory board is also involved in the most important decisions 
of the company. The Management board, on the other hand, is composed exclusively by 
executive members or insiders as opposed to the supervisory board which is composed of 
inside and outside directors and in most of the cases, also by employee representatives.  These 
employee representatives who are included in the supervisory board, have a main objective to 
supervise the interests of the employees of the company. According to Gregory and 
Simmelkjaer II (2002) the supervisory board and the board of directors in the unitary model, 
have the same functions in the corporate governance mechanisms of a company as their 
members are elected by the shareholders in both board models. The authors also suggest that 
the supervisory board in the two-tier model and the board of directors in the unitary board are 
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responsible for electing the members of the management board and they are also involved in 
matters regarding the financial reporting and control of the company. 
However, in countries where a two-tier structure is predominant in the codes of best practices 
recommendations and also in the structure of the board adopted by the companies, these best 
practices allow companies to adopt a unitary model if it were more efficient for them. If we 
look at the case of Italy, in particular, three different structures for the board of directors are 
recommended for Italian listed companies. For The Italian Code of corporate governance of 
2006, the main structure is the traditional model of corporate governance which is composed 
by the board of directors and its committees as well as the board of Statutory auditors. The 
board of directors has the same functions as the unitary or the supervisory board while the 
members of the board of Statutory auditors have duties such as to oversee the functioning of 
the board of directors, control the financial reporting system of the company and elect its 
external. According to the Italian law, members of the board of Statutory auditors are 
independent from the company and elected by the shareholders. They are supposed to act 
independently in all the situations where a conflict of interest may arise between the 
management and the shareholders. According to the Italian Code of best practices (2006), as 
the other two models are only recently introduced, their application by Italian firms should be 
very limited compared to the traditional model. However, at the time speaking, as a result of 
the legitimation suggested by Zattoni and Cuomo, (2008) we predict that the number of Italian 
listed companies adopting the unitary model of corporate governance has increased.  
Another important difference in the corporate governance codes of European countries is 
related to the presence of employee representatives in the board of directors. For countries 
such as Austria, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and Sweden, companies of a certain size 
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must include employee representatives in their board of directors or supervisory board. In 
these countries, the members elected by the employees have the same rights in the board as the 
other members elected from the shareholders. In Germany companies with more than 2000 
employees are obliged to have a board of directors in which half of the members are employee 
representatives. In these companies, the Chairman of the supervisory board is always elected 
by the shareholders and is not an employee representative. In cases where half of the 
supervisory board is composed by employee representatives, for all purposes, it is the 
Chairman of the board who has the casting vote which gives a majority to the supervisory 
board members who are elected by the shareholders.  
In France, the employees have the right to hold shares of the company. In the case where 
employee shareholdings exceed 3% of the total outstanding shares of the company, those 
employees have the right to appoint members in the board of directors. These elected members 
have the same rights as the directors elected by the shareholders, just like in the other 
countries mentioned above.  
Gregory and Simmelkjaer II (2002) make a comparative analysis on the corporate governance 
recommendations of fifteen EU member states to understand differences and similarities 
among the countries of the union.  According to them, the European countries present 
important similarities with regards to the best practices of corporate governance. They suggest 
that the differences found between the recommendations are due to different company laws 
and securities regulations rather than in the best practices recommendations. The roles of 
board of directors in the unitary system and those of the supervisory board in the two-tier are 
very similar, because of the important influence from the international corporate governance 
best practices.  
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Differences in the structure and the composition also exist among the committees that assist 
the board of directors or the supervisory board during their normal activities. The audit 
committee is the committee that is responsible for the financial reporting system of the 
company, the internal control, internal audit functions and has also the possibility to choose 
the external auditing firm of the company. However, the recommendations regarding the main 
functions of the audit committee and also its composition are not the same for all the countries 
of our study. In the case of German listed companies, the audit committee will include 
employee representatives who will be of the same number as the members elected by the 
shareholders, excluding the Chairman of the committee who is always elected by the 
shareholders.   
The Italian audit committee is also different in the functions and structure compared to the 
audit committee of most of the European countries. It seems that the duties regarding the audit 
committee of the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance are divided between the 
Internal control committee and the board of Statutory auditors. According to Melis (2004), 
some of the responsibilities  of the Internal control committee, include the monitoring of the 
internal auditing staff, the reporting of its activities to the board of directors and also the 
cooperating with the external auditing company. These responsibilities are in line with the 
functions of audit committees under the Anglo-Saxon model. Other functions, such as 
controlling the financial reporting system of the company, are responsibility of the board of 
Statutory auditors and they are also pertinent to the Anglo-Saxon audit committee model. 
According to Melis (2004) as the members of the board of Statutory auditors are elected by the 
shareholders, and because their main responsibility is to monitor the board of director’s 
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activities, in Italy the Internal risk and control committee resembles the audit committee 
recommended by the Anglo-Saxon best practices.  
With the 8
th 
EU Company Law Directive on Statutory Audit (2006), the EU recommended that 
all the required entities establish an audit committee. In countries such as Austria and Spain 
the constitution of an audit committee is mandatory by law. Böhm et al. (2013) indicate that 
audit committees have evolved becoming a mandatory element for the governance system in 
Europe and the main concern, according to them, is how to design an audit committee rather 
than establishing one. However, they find that differences still exist in the recommendations of 
the codes related to the responsibilities of the audit committee, the competencies of its 
members, and the proportion of independent members in the committee.  
Another important difference of the board of directors composition is related to the members 
elected by the major shareholders of the company. In some countries the best practices 
recommend that some of the board members be representatives of the major shareholders. A 
major shareholder is a shareholder who owns a significant percentage of the outstanding 
shares of the company. Corporate governance codes of countries such as Germany, France and 
Sweden suggest that major shareholders owning a certain amount of shares, have the 
possibility to nominate members that will act in their interests on the board. 
After having documented the literature and reviewed the evolution of corporate governance 
codes, in the next section, we present an in depth descriptive analyses of the best practices 
guidelines regarding the independence of boards, audit committees and the CEO duality for 
the 17 countries we examine in this study. 
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2.1.1 Descriptive analyses of best practices in European countries   
Table 1 describes the best practices for European countries on the composition of board of 
directors, audit committees and the separation of duties between the CEO and Chairman. We 
focus on the recommendations of the degree of independent members on the board of directors 
and the audit committee. To analyze the recommendations of the best practices, we took the 
most recent corporate governance codes with which the companies of our sample are 
complying. To identify the codes that our sample firms comply with, we analyze the corporate 
governance reports of these firms. We do not take into consideration what the laws of the 
European countries suggest in matters regarding the composition of the board of directors, 
audit committee or the division of duties between the CEO/ Chairman.  Most of the codes 
examined in this study are released from the stock exchanges in which the companies are 
listed. Other issuers of governance codes are either the government or other associations. The 
main source used in this study to find the corporate governance codes of the European 
countries, is the European Corporate Governance Institute (ecgi)
2
. 
After analyzing the recommendations, we observe that they are different from one European 
country to another. Each of the countries covered in our study differ in its requirements 
regarding the proportion of independent members on the board of directors. Only three 
countries out of sixteen recommend a majority of board of directors’ members to be 
independent. Uk corporate governance code of 2010 recommends that at least half of the 
board members excluding the chairman should be independent. As the chairman of the board 
of directors, according to the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010), is independent on the 
                                                          
2
 We made a search in the website of the ecgi ( http://www.ecgi.org/codes/ ) and found that all the codes 
object of our study where available in the website. 
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appointment as chairman this brings that the majority of the board of directors be independent. 
Netherlands corporate governance guidelines are stricter suggesting that only one member of 
the board of directors be dependent while all the other be independent. In most of the cases, 
the dependent member is the CEO of the company. Denmark’s best practices recommend that 
the majority of the members elected by the shareholders be independent. However, in most of 
the cases, this majority does not represent the majority of all the members of the board of 
directors because in the board composition of Danish firms, the employee representatives who 
are not qualified as independent members are also taken in consideration. In France, there is a 
clear distinction between widely held and controlled firms. According to the French Corporate 
Governance code, only the widely held companies
3
 are recommended to have a majority of 
independent members in the board of directors.  
As we mentioned above, only a small number of countries recommend the majority of the 
board of directors’ independence while most of the countries recommend only a minimum 
number of independent directors. Spain and Greece recommend one third of the board to be 
independent while Belgium, Finland, Sweden and Norway require that a fixed number of 
directors be independent. For Austria and France, the recommendations depend on the 
ownership structure of the firm. However in Austria, as opposed to France, the proportion of 
recommended independent members is lower. We note that almost all the best practices 
recommend a minimal number of independent members except for Portugal, Luxembourg and 
Germany, in which the presence of independent members in the board is only mentioned 
without indications nor specifications about their required proportions. Italy and Switzerland 
                                                          
3
 The French corporate governance code of 2010 indicates as widely held those companies in which no 
shareholder owns more than 20% of the shares of the companies. 
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have no recommendations whatsoever on the required proportion of independent members in 
the board. 
We observe more similarities in the recommendations of the best practices regarding the audit 
committee independence. For most of the countries the best practices recommend that the 
majority of the members of the audit committee be independent. However, countries such as 
Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland do not mention a clear proportion of required 
independent members in the audit committee. In Norway, it is suggested that the majority of 
the members of the audit committee should be independent from the company. Because in our, 
we posit that that a member should also be independent from the company and the major 
shareholders to be qualified as independent, we can not consider the Norwegian code of 
corporate governance’s independence criteria. Hence, according to this study’s definition, 
Norway does not recommend a proportion of independence for the audit committee. France is 
the country that recommends the largest proportion of independence in the audit committee 
while countries such as Spain, Uk, Finland, Sweden and Germany recommend only a 
minimum number of independent members in the audit committee. 
We also analyze the recommendations regarding the presence of the Chairman of the board of 
directors in the audit committee. Results are very different and most of the countries do not 
have specific recommendations regarding the presence of the Chairman in the audit 
committee. For countries such as the UK, Denmark, Finland or Germany, it is specified in the 
best practices that the Chairman should not be member of the audit committee. As for the 
Netherlands, the Chairman may assist the audit committee but not as a Chairman of the 
committee. In Austria, the Chairman should not be or have been member of the management 
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in the past three years. In Portugal, the Chairman of the board of directors is allowed to be a 
member of the audit committee only if he is qualified as independent. 
Nevertheless, differences in the recommendations and the composition of audit committees 
still exist. This is in line with Collier and Zaman (2005) who suggest that, although the audit 
committee is adopted in all the European best practices, the recommendations in the structure 
and composition of these committees are different among the countries. Comparing our 
findings for the audit committee recommendations with those from the Sarbanes-Oxley act 
and the SEC rules for listed companies, we notice that none of the countries in our study 
recommend a fully independent audit committee. Even the UK which is an Anglo-Saxon 
country does not recommend a fully independent audit committee but a minimum number of 
three independent members. We suggest that this principle is related to the fact that the audit 
committees in UK firms are composed of a small number of members, who in most of the 
cases, are all independent non-executive members. 
Our findings related to the separation of duties between the CEO and Chairman are more 
consistent throughout our sample of European firms. We identify that many of the best 
practices recommend the division of roles of the CEO and Chairman of the Board. However, 
not all the countries recommend the division of duties between the two roles. In the guidelines 
for best practices in countries such as France, Spain, Greece, Switzerland and Italy, the CEO is 
also allowed to be Chairman of the audit committee. In the case of Denmark, there are no 
recommendations for the separation of duties. 
In Table 1, we classify our sample countries, in the order of the strongest to the weakest 
governance practices. According to the results of other studies (Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; 
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Peasnell et al., 2005; Ramzi Benkraiem, 2011) we define as strong governance practices, those 
best practices that recommend a majority of independent members on the board of directors as 
well as on the audit committee and the separation of duties between CEO/ Chairman (Dechow 
et al, 1996; Jensen, 1993). These practices are closely related to the Anglo-Saxon best 
practices, also defined as the global best practices (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001). For the 
audit committee, we choose the majority instead of the fully independence because, in the UK 
the best practices recommend that the audit committee be composed of at least three 
independent members.  In the studies above-mentioned the results for the audit committee 
composition do not change whether the committee is mostly or fully independent. 
The classification in Table 1 is made as follows. We begin by the analysis by identifying the 
countries that recommend the majority of the board of directors be composed of independent 
members. Next, for we identify the countries that recommend a majority of independent 
members in the audit committee. Finally, we classify the countries according to the corporate 
governance guidelines requiring the separation of duties between the CEO and Chairman. 
Hence to classify countries according to their governance best practice guidelines from the 
strictest to the weakest, in the case that more than one country recommends the majority of 
independence, we control for the audit committee independence and then for the separation of 
duties between the CEO and Chairman. 
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Table 1 
 
Corporate governance recommendations for the Board of directors and Audit committee by country 
Country % of independence Audit committee 
Chairman 
presence 
CEO/ 
Chairman 
Size 
UK 
at least half of the board 
excluding the chairman 
50+1 
at least three independent non-executive 
directors 
3 not member no 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
Denmark 
at least half of the 
members elected by the 
shareholders 
50+1 majority 50+1 not member 
not 
mentioned 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
Netherland all except one all - 1 mentioned but with no specifications 0 
not chairman of 
the audit 
no 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
France 
in widely-held=half of 
the members; controlled 
companies=at least a 
third 
50+1= 
widely 
held; one 
third= 
controlled 
at least equal to two thirds 2/3 no indications allowed no indications 
Greece at least one third 1/3 majority 50+1 no indications allowed 
more than 7 
and less than 
15 
Spain at least one third 1/3 
The committee should be formed exclusively of 
external directors and have a minimum of three 
members. Should be chaired by an independent 
director 
1 no indications allowed 5-15 
Belgium 
at least 3 independent 
non-executive members 
3 majority 50+1 not member no 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
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Table 1 
 
Corporate governance recommendations for the Board of directors and Audit committee by country
Country Board independence Audit committee independence 
Chairman 
presence 
CEO/ 
Chairman 
Size 
Finland at least two 2 at least one member 1 not member no 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
Sweden at least two 2 at least one member 1 no indications no no indications 
Norway at least two 2 majority should be independent of the company 0 no indications no 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
Austria 
free float more than 
20%= at least one 
independent; free float 
more than 50%= at least 
two  
free float 
>20%=1; 
free float 
>50%=2 
majority 50+1 
not member of 
the management 
in the past three 
years 
no 
not more than 
10 without the 
employees 
Portugal 
adequate number of 
independent members 
0 majority by law 50+1 
allowed if 
independent 
no 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
Luxembourg 
mentioned but with no 
specifications 
0 majority 50+1 not member no max 16 
Germany 
mentioned but with no 
specifications 
0 
the chairman should be independent and not be 
a member of the Management Board of the 
company whose appointment ended less than 
two years ago. 
1 not member no no indications 
Swiss 
majority non-executive 
members 
0 
the committee should consist of non-executive 
members preferably independent 
0 allowed allowed 
mentioned but 
with no 
specifications 
Italy no indications 0 majority 50+1 no indications allowed no indications 
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According to our results, UK has the strongest corporate governance practices followed by 
Denmark, Netherlands and so on. Uk has the strongest corporate governance mechanisms 
because according to our definition of strong governance it recommends that half of the 
members of the board of directors to be independent with the chairman being independent 
on appointment. For the Uk, the audit committee is also supposed to be independent as the 
best practices recommend at least three members be independent. As the Anglo-Saxon 
audit committees are composed on average of four people the Uk audit committees are 
independent according to our definition of independence. These results are in line with La 
Porta et al. (1999), who suggest that common law countries have stronger corporate 
governance compared to the civil law countries. Denmark is second because, although it 
recommends a majority of board members to be independent, only those elected by the 
shareholders may be qualified as independent and so, the degree of independence is 
compromised. However, corporate governance in Denmark is stronger than the Dutch best 
practices because, although Netherlands recommend that all the members of the board of 
directors except one should be independent, they don’t specify the degree of independence 
for the members of the audit committee. For our study and our definition of independence, 
exceeding the majority level of independent members on a board doesn’t necessarily 
improve the quality of governance. Accordingly, studies suggest that dependent inside 
directors on the board may contribute in improving the governance of a firm because of 
their knowledgeable insights on a firm’s activities and board composed exclusively of 
outsiders are not recommended (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Weisbach, 1988).  
In France, corporate governance guidelines of best practices are better than in Greece 
because, the guidelines in France differ according to the corporate ownership structure. As 
such, the French widely held firms are recommended to have a board composed of a 
majority of independent members.  On the other hand, French controlled firms are 
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recommended to have independent members that count for at least one third of their board 
composition.  This latter recommendation is similar to the general guidelines for board 
independence of Spanish firms, regardless of their ownership structure. France also 
recommends more than a majority of the audit committee members be independent.  
In our study, we observe many similarities in the best practices for the three Scandinavian 
countries, Finland, Sweden and Norway, suggesting the same quality of governance 
between these countries. The recommendations regarding the board composition and 
independence are the same for all three countries. Moreover, Finland and Sweden have the 
same recommendations regarding the independence of audit committees while for Norway 
no clear indications are specified in this regard.  These three countries also require the 
division of duties between the CEO and Chairman.  
The countries that have weakest corporate governance according to our study are Portugal, 
Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland and Italy. These countries do not recommend any 
proportion of independent members in the board of directors and the main differences are 
related to the composition of their audit committee. Although, Italy recommends majority 
of independent director in the audit committee, according to our analysis, it is the country 
that has the weakest corporate governance guidelines, because there are no indication 
regarding the presence of independent members on the board of directors, nor is there a 
required division of duties between the CEO and Chairman. 
Our classification is in line with La Porta et al.’s (1999) study that classifies countries 
according to their strong or weak corporate governance. The only exemptions are Spain 
and Norway which according to our classification they recommend only a minimum 
proportion of independence in the board of directors and can not be classified as having 
strong corporate governance contrary to La Porta et al.'s (1999) study. 
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2.2 Studies focusing on the independence criteria 
The important role that independent directors have in improving the corporate governance 
has been widely studied by scholars. There is a common idea that increasing independent 
directors in the boards increases also the corporate governance quality of a firm. This is 
also shared by international organisms who demand more independent directors in the 
boards of the companies, specifically where the agency problems may arise. However, due 
to the differences in the culture, capital markets or ownership structure of the firms among 
countries it is not always possible to measure the impact that independent directors have in 
improving the corporate governance quality of the firms. For some firms due to the 
differences in the countries corporate law or corporate governance recommendations it is 
difficult and costly to adopt more independent mechanisms of corporate governance. 
2.2.1 Independent directors and the agency problem  
The literature is dominated by studies addressing the role of corporate governance in 
mitigating the agency problems. These studies analyzing different mechanisms of 
governance for the firms measure the role that these governance mechanisms have in 
limiting the risk of expropriation of the shareholders from the managers. The idea is that 
stronger corporate governance mechanisms would help reducing the agency problems and 
thus increase the shareholder’s wealth. The main differences in the studies analyzing the 
role of corporate governance in mitigating the agency are related to the governance 
mechanisms they use to analyze. According to Brown et al., 2011 most of the studies focus 
on one particular component of governance when analyzing the corporate governance.  
A wide part of the scholars when analyzing the corporate governance use indices 
developed by professional agencies (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Doidge et al., 2007; Khanna 
et al., 2006;  Wojcik, 2006). These indices develop a corporate governance score that takes 
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into account different governance elements and higher the score higher will be also the 
governance quality of the firm. The score is the result of the different qualities of the 
governance of the firms taken together. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) for example, document a 
positive correlation between good corporate governance as measured by the index they use 
in their study and the firm’s performance. Doidge et al., (2007) using different governance 
ratings explain how country chrateristics such as investor protection or the economic 
development influence firms improvements of corporate governance mechanisms. For a 
sample of European companies, Renders and Vandenbogaerde (2004), find that better 
corporate governance is associated with less earning management suggesting the impact of 
the governance in improving the accounting quality. The authors use a rating developed 
from a professional rating agency in order to measure the corporate governance, the 
Deminor Rating. This rating is an aggregate rating of different governance elements for a 
firm and Deminor Rating analyses the corporate governance of the companies belonging to 
the FTSEurofirst 300
4
. Renders et al., (2010) using the corporate governance ratings 
developed by a professional rating agency, find a correlation between the corporate 
governance ratings and the firms performance suggesting that improvements in the 
governance ratings are accompanied by improvements in the performance of the firms. 
However, as suggested by Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009), researchers should abandon 
using the governance scores as they do not take into consideration the different agency 
problems that arise in the case of companies with different ownership structure. They 
suggest that because the problems for widely held and controlled companies differ from 
each other a score that does take into consideration the different agency problems arising in 
these companies will not be able to measure the corporate governance of the company. As 
a result of the different problems and limits that the professional governance ratings 
                                                          
4
 This index represents the 300 major companies in listed in European markets ranked by the market 
capitalization. 
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present, most of the literature focuses only in particular elements of governance when 
measuring the effects of good corporate governance in relation to the agency problems.  
It is not clear yet if corporate governance improves firm’s performances. Brown et al., 
(2011) suggest that studies are controversial and yet there is not a clear idea on the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the firm’s performance. While  Renders et al., 
(2010) finds evidence of firm performance using governance ratings other studies, mainly 
in US, measuring the role of insider ownership on firm performance do not find any 
significant relation suggesting that not all the governance characteristics play the same role 
in increasing the firm performances (Coles et al., 2012; McConnell et al., 2008).  
Corporate governance affects the cost of equity capital (Chen et al., 2011) and also the cost 
of debt financing (Anderson et al., 2004). Analyzing a sample of 2161 firms from the G-
index Chen et al., (2008) find that strong shareholder rights are associated with lower cost 
of equity. Anderson et al., (2004) taking into account the board independence and size find 
that these governance variables are associated with lower cost of debt financing for a 
sample of S&P 500 firms. 
Corporate governance is also related to the financial reporting quality. Insiders may use the 
financial reporting system for reasons that benefit their interests instead of protecting the 
shareholders’ interests. In fact if the agency problems do not exist insiders do not have any 
reason to hide the information and so the accounting quality it is supposed to be higher. 
According to Bushman and Smith (2001) corporate governance exists to ensure that the 
minority shareholders receive reliable information on the value of the firm and to protect 
the minority shareholders’ interests form the opportunisms of the managers and large 
shareholders. They point out that corporate governance is also important in forcing 
managers to maximize the value of the firm. Even in the absence of the agency costs the 
authors suggest that corporate governance is useful in providing better information on 
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managers in evaluating the value of the investments. Further they argue that improved 
governance makes possible the reducing costs of monitoring of the managerial 
opportunism by the shareholders and also limits the private benefits that the managers can 
extract form the company.  
Sloan (2001) points out that there is a clear link between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and the financial accounting of a company. The accounting information is 
relevant to determine the performances of the managers and also to determine the payoffs 
of the stakeholders. He suggests that the financial accounting system is the only way the 
outsiders have to be in possess of the information they need about the risk and allocation 
related to their investments. According to his study also the inverse correlation is 
important. Accounting information is also important in providing the necessary 
information to the corporate governance mechanisms to operate efficiently.  
Of particular interest for the researchers and also object of several debates has been one 
particular characteristic of the board of directors which is the presence of independent 
members or outside directors in the board of directors and audit committee. There are a 
large number of studies analyzing the different roles that the independent directors have in 
mitigating the agency problems.  
Studies in US (Xie et al., 2003; Klein, 2002;) document that the presence of independent 
directors is associated with less earning management suggesting that outside directors play 
an important role in mitigating the agency problems and so improving the financial 
reporting quality. Klein, (2002) using a sample from S&P 500 for the years 1992-
1993finds a negative relation between board independence and earnings management as 
measured by the abnormal accruals. She also suggests that these results are more 
pronounced when there is not a majority of independent members in the board of directors 
or the audit committee. According to her study, when the number of independent directors 
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diminishes the level of abnormal accruals increases for the companies of the sample. 
Conflicting results are found from Xie et al., (2003) analyzing the same sample of 
companies as Klein, (2002). They suggest that only when both independent directors and 
directors with corporate experience are included in the board earnings management is less 
likely to occur.  
However, regarding the proportion of independent directors on the board no study finds 
significant results between a board comprised exclusively of independent directors and 
their role in improving the corporate governance quality. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that it is not recommended a board comprised exclusively of outside directors. Insiders 
usually are those who are also financial experts and have specific information and 
expertise which provides them with more knowledge to manage the firm. In fact studies 
focusing on the independence criteria suggest that there is no significant relation between a 
fully independent board of directors or audit committee and the firm’s agency conflicts 
(Klein, 2002).   
The role of independent directors and their importance as potential referee in mitigating the 
agency problems has been studied widely also in Europe. However, all the studies have in 
common the fact that none of them does a cross country analysis to see the impact of 
independent directors as a potential mechanism of good corporate governance.  Peasnell et 
al.,(2005) for a sample of UK firms find that firms with higher outside independent 
directors are associated with less income-increasing earning management consistent with 
the hypothesis that earnings management is negatively related with the presence of 
independent directors. Same results are found by Benkraiem, (2011) for France suggesting 
that their presence can moderate earning management and the role of independent directors 
becomes  more effective when they represent at least one third of the board. However, 
these associations are not the same for other European countries. Chalevas and Tzovas 
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(2010) for example, analyzing a Greek sample of firms find that there is no relation 
between the increased number of independent members in the board and earnings 
manipulation. The authors find an inverse relationship between independent directors and 
the weighted average cost of capital. 
Studies have been controversial in relation to the role of independent directors with the 
firm performance and there is not a clear idea of the role of independent directors with the 
performance of the company. Block (1999) finds that the market reacts positively on the 
announcements of the appointment of outside directors on the board. Other studies mainly 
focusing in US do not find any relation between the presence of independent members in 
the board and the firm performance. While Dahya et al., (2008) in a cross-country analysis 
suggests that the  performance of the firms increases with the presence of independent 
members on the board, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) for a US sample do not find significant 
relation between outside members and firm performance. 
A substantial number of studies analyses the role of the audit committee and in particular 
the audit committee independence in relation to the agency problems. The presence of 
independent directors is important also for the well-functioning of the audit committee. 
The primary role of the audit committee is to assist the board in matters regarding the 
financial statements of the company, the audit quality or in reviewing the external auditing 
process. The audit committee has also the possibility to choose the external auditor. As the 
primary role of the audit committee is to control the financial reporting system of the 
company this committee is important in preventing the agency problems and so limit the 
self-interest behaviors of the insiders and having independent members in the audit 
committee will improve this effectiveness. Studies have analyzed the proportion of 
independent members in the audit committee and their role in improving the financial 
reporting quality (Peasnell et al., 2005;Abbott et al, 2004; Klein, 2002). Klein (2002) finds 
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that when audit committees are composed of a majority of independent directors 
companies engage in less earnings management as measured by abnormal accruals. These 
results according to her study are more pronounced when the number of independent 
members decreases. However the author do not find any significant relation between an 
audit committee comprised exclusively of independent directors and earnings management 
suggesting that audit committees fully independent are not effective in mitigating the 
agency problems. Abbott et al., (2004) for a sample of US firms during the years 1991-
1999 find that the financial statements restatements occur less when the companies have an 
audit committee comprised only of independent directors. However not all the studies 
support the hypothesis that independent members in the audit committee limit the agency 
problems. Xie et al., (2003) do not find a significant relation between the percentage of 
outside members on the board and the discretionary current accruals. Same results 
suggested by Agrawal and Chadha (2005)  who do not find any significant relation 
between the audit committee independence and the probability of earning restatements 
from the firms. For France Piot and Janin (2007) suggest that only the existence of an audit 
committee is related to with less earnings management but the authors do not find any 
significant relation between an independent audit committee and earnings management. 
Finally, independent directors are also important for companies operating in countries with 
weak investor protection. Countries with weak investor protection do not ensure a strong 
protection for the minority shareholders and having independent directors on the board 
may be important for the minority shareholders in order to protect their investment in the 
company. Kim et al., (2007) analyzing a sample of firms for 14 European countries found 
that when the minority shareholder’s rights are strong there is a significant presence of 
independent members in the board suggesting that in these countries the minority 
shareholders have more legal power to affect the board of directors and so to nominate 
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more independent members. They suggest that for these countries the minority shareholder 
law and board independence are complements for the governance of these firms.  
2.2.2 Differences in the classification of independent directors 
Other studies focus on the recommendations of the codes of best practices on the role and 
the functions of the independent members on the board. Examining the independence of 
the non-executive directors, Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) find that almost all the codes of 
governance in 2005 recommend the independence but the definitions and the criteria of 
independence are very different. Examining a sample of 60 countries, they argue that the 
independence criteria is commonly accepted by all the best practices but the meaning of it 
differs significantly in most of these countries. The main differences are related to the civil 
law countries who present a weak definition of the independence. Johanson and Østergren 
(2010), in their descriptive study for the governance codes of UK and Sweden, compare 
the recommendations of the codes on board independence. Although there are some 
similarities in these recommendations, they also find important differences between the 
two countries. The main difference is that in Sweden, major shareholders are defined as 
independent whereas, in the UK best practices, they are not.  Another important difference 
is that the UK is a shareholder oriented country and Sweden a stakeholder oriented one. 
The similarities between the codes of these countries are influenced by the global best 
practices of corporate governance. 
Of particular interests are the studies of Crespi and Pascal Fuster, 2013 and  Santella et al., 
2006, who analyze the misclassification of the proportion of independent members 
declared by the board. Crespi and Pascal Fuster (2013) analyze a sample of Spanish listed 
firms find that the proportion of independent directors disclosed in the firms’ corporate 
governance reports is higher compared to the filter they used to measure the degree of 
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independent directors. They develop a stricter definition of independence that takes into 
account the best practices of Uk code of corporate governance, NYSE and EU Commission 
recommendations and by applying this definition to the companies of their sample report a 
misclassification of the independent director by the firms. This misclassification according 
to the authors is higher for the members of the committees such as the audit committee and 
also for firms controlled by managers. 
Santella et al., (2006) analyze the degree of independent directors on a sample of Italian 
companies, by using the independence requirements of the EC Recommendation (2005) on 
the non-executive and supervisory directors. Using the independence criteria suggested by 
the EU recommendations, the authors find that the proportion of independent director on 
the board is very low. One particular requirement that is not applied by the companies 
when determining independence, is the one suggesting that directors should not have any 
business relationship with the firm to be qualified as independent. 
2.3 Studies analyzing the convergence 
In Europe, with the creation of a unique capital market and also with the international 
organisms that are pushing to minimize the divergences of the corporate practices across 
the European countries, convergence is becoming of particular interests for researchers. 
The literature analyzing the convergence of the corporate governance for European 
countries or companies located in Europe is divided in two research methodologies. One 
part of the studies focuses in explaining the convergence by analyzing the corporate 
governance codes of each country and define the convergence degree according to 
similarities or differences in these practices (Cicon et al., 2012; Collier and Zaman, 2005). 
The other studies using data of corporate governance of listed companies in a cross country 
analysis defines the convergence as the degree of similarities or differences among the 
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practices of corporate governance that these companies adopt (Markarian et al., 2007; 
Wojcik, 2006).  
The first empirical paper to provide an explanation of the convergence is the study of 
Markarian et al., (2007). The authors analyzing a sample of 75 large firms from different 
countries all over the world for the years 1995-2002 examine the governance and also the 
disclosure practices of the sample selected. They find that the governance practices for the 
sample firms are moving towards more independent organisms of corporate governance, 
mechanisms that are similar to those of Anglo-Saxon countries. However, regarding the 
disclosure practices the authors conclude that both Anglo-Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon 
firms are improving their disclosure practices but there is no convergence towards an 
Anglo-Saxon model. One limit of this study may be related to the sample the authors 
choose to analyze. As the sample is a set of large companies it is easy to think that for 
reasons such as cross-listing or the existence of large international investors these 
companies are more interested to adopt corporate governance mechanisms that are widely 
accepted.  
Using a recent sample of only European listed companies for the years 2000 and 2004 
Wojcik (2006) finds that the companies have improved their corporate governance  rating 
during the years. By using corporate governance ratings developed by a professional rating 
agency such as Deminor Rating SA the author measures the governance ratings for Anglo-
Saxon and non Anglo-Saxon. He finds that non Anglo-Saxon companies have reduced the 
differences between the ratings suggesting that a convergence is in act. The governance 
mechanisms that improved significantly were the board structure and functioning and also 
the disclosure practices of the firms. Wojcik (2006) study is of particular interest because 
is the first study to use a sample of only European firms to measure the convergence 
between the two types of cultures, Anglo-Saxon and non. However, one limit of the study 
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could be the fact that the author is using a governance rating developed by a professional 
agency. As Daines et al ., (2010) suggests, the professional governance ratings may not 
provide useful information to the shareholders and they also have limits in predicting 
companies’ performance or other outcomes. 
The other two studies (Cicon et al., 2012; Collier and Zaman, 2005) focus on the corporate 
governance codes of the European countries. Collier and Zaman (2005) analyze the 
recommendations of the codes of corporate governance related to the structure and the 
functioning of the audit committee. The objective is to demonstrate any degree of 
convergence between the European codes of corporate governance and the Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance being the audit committee a structure adopted from the 
Anglo-Saxon countries. The authors find a convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon 
principles of corporate governance as the audit committee is widely recommended in the 
codes of governance of the European countries.  
Cicon et al., (2012), as opposed to the previous studies, fail to find evidence of 
convergence between the corporate governance codes for 23 EU nations only few codes 
are converging towards the Anglo-Saxon models while other are diverging. The authors 
divide by using Latent Semantic Analysis techniques divide the codes by themes that the 
codes emphasize and find no convergence of the governance codes analyzed according to 
the themes. By developing a new classification of the codes by country according to the 
themes contained in the codes they find that their classification is different from the legal 
regimes classification developed by La Porta et al., (1997). 
In the next section we describe the sample of European firms object of this study and also 
the definition of independence used to determine the proportion of independent members 
in the board. We also measure the level of compliance of the firms of the sample with their 
countries’ best practices and the Anglo-Saxon best practices. Finally we also measure the 
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relation between the level of independence and the country’s legal regime and with the 
anti-director rights index developed by La Porta et al., (1999). 
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Chapter III 
Sample selection and research model 
3.1 Data collection and description of the sample 
In the previous section, we described the European corporate governance codes, we 
observed that the recommendations on the number of independent members differ 
significantly among countries. For different reasons, we noted that the best practices are 
significantly related to country specific characteristics and there is not a unique degree of 
independence recommended by most of the corporate governance codes. In the empirical 
part we will measure the degree of independent members in the company boards and how 
the best practices of every country are adopted by the companies. We will also measure the 
degree of compliance of the companies with the global best practices. To do so, we collect 
firm-level data on the level of independent board members and audit committees and on 
the division of duties between the Chairman and the CEO.   
In Table 2, we present the description of our sample. The companies are part of the 
STOXX Europe 600 Index, a subset of STOXX Global 1800 Index and represent 600 
European listed companies with large, medium and small capitalization across seventeen 
countries. The sample is from seventeen different European countries and in this analysis 
we included also the Irish companies present in the index. According to the Irish Stock 
Exchange, Irish listed companies are required to apply on a comply or explain basis with 
UK corporate governance code (June 2010). In this study we excluded 137 financial 
companies due to their different accounting rules. We also excluded 3 firms for which 
corporate governance information with regard to the independence criteria of boards and 
audit committee are unavailable or doubtful and our final sample is composed of 463 
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companies distributed in seventeen countries. The distribution of our sample among the 
countries is explained in the Table 2 below. 
Table 2 
    
                                                          INDUSTRY 
  N  
OIL 
& 
GAS 
BASIC 
MATERIALS 
INDUSTRIALS CONSUMER 
GOODS 
HEALTHCARE CONSUMER 
SERVICES 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITIES TECHNOLOGY 
UK 143 13 18 37 18 5 31 4 8 9 
Denmark 12 1 0 3 2 5 0 1 0 0 
Netherlands 26 3 2 10 4 1 3 1 0 2 
France 67 5 3 17 12 3 15 1 4 7 
Greece 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Spain 21 1 1 7 2 1 3 1 5 0 
Belgium 10 0 3 0 2 1 3 1 0 0 
Finland 17 1 3 6 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Sweden 28 1 3 12 4 3 2 2 0 1 
Norway 10 4 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Austria 6 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Portugal 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Luxembourg 3 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Germany 59 0 12 13 12 6 6 2 2 6 
Switzerland 27 0 3 9 6 5 2 1 0 1 
Italy 18 2 0 4 4 0 2 1 5 0 
Ireland 10 0 0 3 1 2 4 0 0 0 
Total 463 33 53 124 71 33 76 19 27 27 
 
As we may observe in the Table 2 our sample is not equally distributed among the 
countries. There are countries that have a significant number of companies and others that 
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have only a minimum. Uk is the country most represented in the sample with 143 
companies while for Greece we have only two companies. Other countries such as Austria, 
Luxembourg and Portugal have also a minimum number of companies compared to the 
other countries. In table 3 we also divided the sample according to their sectors. To divide 
the sample into sectors we used the classification provided from the ICB (Industry 
Classification Benchmark)
5
. The ICB makes a classification between ten sectors but as we 
mentioned above, we excluded the financial firms so our sample is divided in nine sectors. 
Companies are well represented for each sector. The largest number of companies by 
sector is related to the Industrial companies while for the other sectors the distribution is 
quite the same for all the companies. Other sectors that have a large number of companies 
are those related to the Consumer goods and Consumer services. The sector that has a 
small number of companies is the Telecommunications.  
To collect the data on governance we analyzed the corporate governance reports and the 
annual reports for the companies of the sample for the year 2011. Having the three types of 
companies in our sample allows us to generalize the results for all the listed companies 
since one can expect that the large corporations are more predisposed to adopt international 
corporate governance principles, due to their widely held ownership structure.  
3.2 Defining independence 
The objective of the empirical part of our study is to find out how the best practices are 
adopted by the companies. To do so we first define the independence criteria necessary to 
measure the degree of independence on boards. We examined the independence criteria 
used in the codes of corporate governance for the countries of our sample and observed 
                                                          
5
 The Industry Classification Benchmark categorizes over 70,000 companies and 75,000 securities all over 
the world to enable the comparison between the companies. Their website is 
http://www.icbenchmark.com/.  
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that the definition of independence is significantly different among countries. Countries 
adopt different measures with regard to whom the director should be independent. This 
means that the definitions of independence are not clear enough to determine how a board 
member should be qualified as independent. So although almost all the bests practices 
recommend that a board member is independent when he is independent from the 
management, from the company and not having a material business relationship the main 
difference among the best practices is related to the major shareholders where it is not 
specified how a member is qualified independent form the major shareholder. In most of 
the best practices it is not determined the percentage of the shares that the board member 
may own to be qualified as being a shareholder representative. Countries such as Uk, Italy, 
Denmark and Norway recommend that a member of the board should be also independent 
from the major shareholders to be qualified as independent but the percentage of the major 
shareholder it is not specified. In the Uk corporate governance code (2010) among other 
criteria for determining the independence of a board member it is specified that a member 
is dependent when he “represents a major shareholder” but the degree of significant 
shareholding is not specified. 
In the German best practices of 2010 it is specified that a member of the supervisory board 
is “considered independent if he/she has no business or personal relations with the 
company or its Management Board which cause a conflict of interests”. This definition 
does not specify if a member should or should not be a major shareholder representative to 
be qualified as independent. We think that according to this definition a major shareholder 
representative may be qualified as independent in Germany when he is not. For 
Switzerland and Austria we observed the same limits in the definition of independence and 
for these countries as for Germany a member of the board may be qualified as independent 
even though he is a major shareholder representative. 
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For most of the countries of our sample, the degree of independence from the major 
shareholder required to determine the independence of e board member is 10% or more of 
the shares (voting rights) of the company which is in line with the SEC (OECD 2004). 
Spain and Portugal have lower percentages to assess the independence from the major 
shareholders which are 5% for Spain and 2 % for Portugal.  
As the definition of independence is different among the countries of our sample to use the 
same definition of independence we developed our own measure of independence. To 
compare the different mechanisms of governance regarding the proportion of independent 
members we first need to use the same measure. Our measure of independence is 
developed taking into account the recommendations provided by the SEC rules, corporate 
governance codes of European countries, the OECD and the EU commission 
recommendations.  
To begin with, we refer to independent director as the director who is a non-executive and 
independent member of the board. In this case neither an employee nor a member of the 
management may be qualified as an independent director. Our definition is in line with 
most of the codes of governance of Europe that use the definition of “independent non-
executive directors” as the independent members on the board. In different studies the 
independent members are also defined as outsiders, or non-executives or independent 
members. According to our definition a director is not independent if he or she: 
a) is or has been an employee of the company or its group or an executive member 
of the board within the past three years; 
b) is an external auditor of the company or has a relationship with the external 
auditor of the company; 
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c) receives directly or as a partner a significant remuneration from the company or 
any other related company or person for services or advices not connected with 
his duties as director of the board; 
d) has significant business relationship with the company or a related company, 
directly or as a partner, shareholder, member of the board of directors or 
management of another company who has such relationship; 
e) the director holds cross-directorship or has relationships with other directors of 
other companies that have links with the company; 
f) the director is not a major shareholder6 of the company or represents a major 
shareholder of the company; 
g) holds shares that together with shareholder rights that he owns in the same 
company as a result of the control that he exercises in other companies are more 
than 10% in the company where he is classified as an independent director. 
h) has close family ties with persons that fulfill any of the points above 
This definition of independence is stricter compared to the definition of the codes of best 
practice of the European countries. Using a stricter definition of independence allows us to 
be sure that the directors qualified as independent according to our definition is really 
independent as so he acts independently in all the matters of the board of directors or the 
other committees. In this definition to qualify a member as independent he should be 
independent from the company, the management and he must not be a major shareholder 
representative. He also should not have any material business relationship with the 
company.  
                                                          
6
 A major shareholder is a shareholder who holds more than 10% of the shares or voting rights of the 
company. 
73 
 
The source we used for the corporate governance codes is the European Corporate 
Governance Institute (ECGI) an international scientific non-profit association seeking to 
improve corporate governance in Europe and elsewhere. We only analyzed the English 
translations of the codes and in the case that for some countries we didn’t find the 
corporate governance code in the ECGI, we made a web research to obtain it. 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistic on the proportion of independent members on the Board of 
Directors and the Audit Committee 
We start the analysis by identifying the degree of independent members in the board of 
directors, audit committee and the separation of duties between the CEO/ Chairman. More 
specifically the variables used in our analysis are: the proportion and the number of 
independent members on the board of directors, the proportion and the number of 
independent members in the audit committee, the size of the board of directors and the 
audit committee and the division of roles between the CEO and the Chairman of the board 
of directors. We analyzed the corporate governance reports of our sample firms and 
according to our definition of independence we measured the number of directors that may 
be qualified as independent according to this definition. When the corporate governance 
report did not offer all the information we needed to determine the independence of the 
directors, we also performed  a web research to see the different links that directors may 
have with the company or its’ shareholders in order to better assess the independence of 
the directors. We constructed dummy variables to identify the CEO/ Chairman duality, the 
majority of independent members in the board of director and audit committee. We also 
measured the number of companies that adopted a fully independent audit committee to 
measure the degree of compliance of our sample firms with the Anglo-Saxon principles of 
governance. In Table 3 we report the list and the description of the variables used in the 
study. 
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Table 3 
List and description of the corporate governance variables 
 
 
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics on the level of independence of the board, audit 
committee and the independence of the Chairman, for all the firms in the study. We 
divided the sample of companies by country and measured the value for all the variables 
identified. As shown in Table 4, there is a variation in the value of the proportion of 
independence across countries, consistent with the prior section’s descriptive analyses of 
the best practices. 
With regard to the proportion of independence of the board of directors, we note that the 
results are very different among the analyzed countries. Countries such as Finland and 
Netherlands present the highest proportion of independent members. It seems that for the 
VARIABLES DEFINITION 
propBOD indep 
proportion of independent members in the board of 
directors 
propAUD indep proportion of independent members in the audit committee 
BOD size number of members in the board of directors 
Num Indep number of independent members in the board of directors 
AuditCom size number of members in the audit committee 
NumAudit indep number of independent members in the audit committee 
Audit Full Ind 
=1, if the audit committee is fully independent; 
=0, otherwise 
CEO /Chair 
=1 if the CEO is also chairman of the BOD; 
=0, otherwise 
% BOD Independence 
=1, if the Board of directors (BOD) has a majority of 
independent directors; 
=0, otherwise 
% Audit Committee 
independence 
=1, if the audit committee has a majority of independent 
directors; 
=0, otherwise 
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Netherlands, the best practices are widely accepted by the companies. Finish companies 
tend to follow the international best practices by adopting a higher degree of independence 
compared to their national corporate governance recommendations. The Anglo-Saxon 
countries, Uk and Ireland tend to also have a high degree of independence in their board of 
directors and this is in line with their best practices. The result observed for Switzerland 
and Austria are particularly interesting. As described in the sections above, these countries 
do not have a strict definition of independence and the independence from the major 
shareholder is not required at all in their best practices. Although we use a stricter measure 
of independence compared to their best practices, these two countries present a high degree 
of independence for their board of directors. Other countries such as Norway, France 
Luxembourg and Sweden also tend to have, on average, a high proportion of independence 
in their board of directors. This is interesting to note because in their best practices a 
majority of independence is not recommended but a lower proportion is suggested. 
Although most of the countries of our sample tend to have companies that present a high 
degree of independence, for countries such as Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Italy or Spain 
this proportion is lower. The companies of these countries have on average less than a 
majority of the board of directors’ independence. For some of these countries, such as 
Germany or Denmark, having employee representatives in the board decreases the 
proportion of independence being the employee representatives not independent according 
to our definition of independence and also according to most best practices of the European 
countries. 
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Table 4 
Descriptive statistics of Board Audit committee Chairman Independence  
 
Country 
 
propBOD 
indep 
propAUD 
indep 
BoD 
SIZE 
NUM    
INDEP 
ADITCOM 
SIZE 
NUMAUDIT 
INDEP 
AUDIT 
FULLIND 
CEO 
CHAIR 
Denmark 
N 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Average ,4812 ,7321 10,17 4,83 3,42 2,33 ,33 ,08 
Finland 
N 17 16 17 17 16 16 16 17 
Average ,8553 ,9635 7,47 6,35 3,31 3,19 ,93 ,00 
France 
N 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 
Average ,5350 ,6978 12,97 6,82 4,03 2,79 ,26 ,62 
Germany 
N 59 58 59 59 58 58 58 59 
Average ,4296 ,4879 13,78 5,61 4,57 2,22 ,05 ,00 
UK 
N 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 143 
Average ,6427 ,9866 9,63 6,15 3,79 3,74 ,96 ,03 
Greece 
N 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Average ,3447 ,6667 11,50 4,00 3,00 2,00 ,50 ,50 
Ireland 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Average ,6861 ,9714 11,60 8,00 3,70 3,50 ,90 ,00 
Italy 
N 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Average ,4534 ,9995 11,67 5,17 3,61 3,05 ,61 ,22 
Luxembourg 
N 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Average ,5852 ,8889 12,67 7,33 4,33 3,67 ,67 ,67 
Netherland 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Average ,8347 ,9071 7,54 6,15 3,46 3,12 ,77 ,00 
Norway 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Average ,6526 ,8750 9,10 5,70 3,20 2,80 ,60 ,10 
Portugal 
N 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 
Average ,3284 ,8889 16,75 5,50 3,33 3,00 ,67 ,00 
Spain 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Average ,4512 ,6587 12,90 5,67 3,95 2,57 ,24 ,43 
Sweden 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Average ,5159 ,7048 11,00 5,46 3,68 2,50 ,36 ,04 
Switzerland 
N 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
Average ,7120 ,7340 9,26 6,59 3,48 2,67 ,48 ,15 
Austria 
N 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Average ,6537 ,5556 11,67 7,33 5,17 2,83 0 ,00 
Belgium 
N 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Average ,4947 ,7600 11,60 5,60 3,70 2,80 ,40 ,10 
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With regard to the size of the board of directors, there are no significant differences among 
the countries of the sample. The range of the board size is between 7 and 13 members. 
Finland, Netherlands and Switzerland have on average smaller boards compared to the 
other countries. Portugal is the country that has the biggest size for the board of directors. 
However, having a small number of Portuguese firms in our sample, we are not able to 
determine if this proportion is representative for all the listed firms of this country.  
For the audit committees, we observe a high compliance with the respective codes and also 
with the best practice recommendations. We find a high degree of independence in the 
European companies showing that the EU recommendations and the international best 
practices are being widely accepted. For the Italian listed companies we analyzed the 
Internal risk and control committee which according to Melis (2004) has a similar role with 
the UK audit committee. In fact for some Italian listed companies of our sample we found 
that they named “audit committee” the internal risk and control committee. 
There is a high proportion of independence in the audit committees of the European 
companies as we reported in Table 4. As we may expect, the Anglo-Saxon countries show 
a high degree of independence which is also in line with the best practices. However, 
interesting are the results for Italy, which show the highest degree of independence 
compared to other countries. The only country that, on average, does not present a majority 
of independent members on the audit committee, is Germany. We think that having 
employee representatives in the audit committee for the German listed companies 
significantly decreases the proportion of independence in these committees.  
For the audit committee’s size as for the board of director’s size we do not observe 
significant differences among the countries. The average size of the audit committees 
ranges between 3 and 6 board members. Germany, Luxembourg and Austria have more 
79 
 
members in the audit committee compared to the other countries. The Anglo-Saxon 
countries present the same size on average for the audit committee in line with our 
expectations. 
We also used the fully independent audit committee variable to observe how the 
companies do comply with this principle. The objective is to see if there is a compliance of 
the companies of our sample with the Anglo-Saxon principles of governance being the 
audit committee full independence required by law in the US. With regard to the fully 
independent audit committee variable, as we could expect we observe that the Anglo-
Saxon countries such as UK and Ireland tend to have a high number of companies adopting 
this principle. However what seems interesting to note is that a relevant number of 
companies from Italy, Finland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal and Norway tend to 
adopt a fully independent audit committee following the US best practices 
recommendations. For Germany and Austria this degree is lower respect the other 
countries. 
Most of the companies of our sample divide the functions of the CEO and Chairman. As 
we may observe even though not all the best practices recommend a division of duties 
between the CEO and Chairman there is a low degree of companies that have as CEO and 
Chairman the same person. The country that has the highest proportion of companies 
having the same person as CEO and Chairman is France. For France the best practices 
have no indications regarding the CEO duality and so most of the French companies prefer 
to have the same person. Taking into account that the number of observation for French 
companies is high we may conclude that most of the companies in France have the same 
person as CEO and chairman of the board of directors. We observe a high proportion of 
CEO duality also for countries such as Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and Greece. 
However, except Luxembourg in which the best practices of the country recommend a 
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division of duties between CEO/ Chairman for the other countries, for the other countries 
the best practices of do not recommend a division of duties between the CEO and 
Chairman. As expected the Anglo-Saxon countries present a low percentage of companies 
that do not divide the roles between the CEO and Chairman.  
In the Table 4 we observe that countries differ significantly among them regarding the 
proportions of independence their companies adopt. For the companies of the sample 
contrary to their best practices we did not find similarities among countries regarding the 
proportion of independence they adopt.  
To better understand the proportion of independence in the board of directors and the audit 
committee in the appendix we show descriptive statistic of the level of independence for 
each company of the sample. For all the countries of the sample we show the proportion of 
independence of the companies regarding the board of directors and the audit committee 
independence. 
4.2 Level of compliance of the companies with the best practices recommendations 
and the independence criteria developed in this study 
Having analyzed the recommendations of the codes of best practices for the countries of 
the sample and also the proportion of independence in the boards we are now able to 
determine the degree of compliance of the companies of our sample with the respective 
country codes and also with our measure of independence. The objective is to determine by 
using a stricter criteria of independence compared to that recommended by the best 
practices how the level of compliance differs in the sample. This analysis will be useful 
also to determine the degree of convergence of the companies of the sample with the 
Anglo-Saxon best practices being our definition of independence related to the Anglo-
Saxon best practices.  
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Table 5 is divided in two sections. The left section presents descriptive statistics on the 
level of compliance of the companies with the respective countries’ best practices. The 
section in the right presents descriptive statistics regarding the level of compliance with the 
measures of independence used in this study. We measured the level of compliance for the 
companies of the sample according to their respective corporate governance codes and then 
with our best practices.  We observe that the level of compliance of the companies with the 
respective country codes of corporate governance is significantly higher compared to the 
compliance with the best practices suggested in this study. This is related to the fact that 
the definition and the degree of independence that we used is very strict compared with the 
different country’s best practices.  
For the board of directors we observe a high level of compliance of the companies with 
their respective country codes of best practices. As we may observe the second part of the 
sample starting from Finland all the companies fully comply with their respective codes. 
However, if we compare these results with the independence measure that we developed, 
the compliance decreases significantly and the values remain the same only for Finland, 
Austria and Luxembourg. The German sample fully complies with their respective codes 
but the level of compliance is very low in the right section for the board of directors.  This 
because only few companies in Germany have a majority of independent members in the 
board of directors which is the condition of our measure of independence. Low degree of 
compliance with our measure of independence but high compliance with the respective 
country codes is seen also for other countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and France. For 
Ireland, Finland and Austria the level of compliance do not change between the two 
sections. For these countries the best practices do not recommend a majority of 
independent members in the board of directors. The companies listed in these countries for 
different reasons tend to comply with the Anglo-Saxon best practices of corporate 
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governance. Interesting results are observed for Netherlands where this is the only country 
of the sample in which the level of compliance with the respective best practices is lower 
compared to the stricter criteria we used. The Dutch best practices require that in the board 
of directors should be all except one independent directors while for our measure we 
require only a majority of the board of directors to be independent. For the board of 
director independence we observe a low level of compliance of companies from Denmark, 
Netherlands, France, and Spain with their respective country codes. 
For the audit committee we observe the same results as for the board of director’s 
independence. Companies tend to comply more with their local best practices compared to 
the independence criteria developed in this study. For countries such as Germany, Sweden 
and Spain there is an important difference between the level of compliance with their local 
best practices and those of the study. We observe a high degree of compliance of the 
companies with their local best practices except for France and Greece for which the 
compliance is lower compared to the other countries. French companies tend to comply 
more with the definition of independence developed in this study compared to their local 
best practices. This because French best practices recommend at least two third of the 
members of the audit committee to be independent while in this study we require only a 
majority of independence. Same results are observed for Uk as their code of best practices 
recommends at least three independent members in the board. Being the Uk board 
composed of only three independent and sometimes not all of them independent changes 
the degree of compliance of the companies with their respective best practices. For the 
audit committee we observe a high degree of compliance of the companies with our 
measure of independence compared with the board of directors. However, companies listed 
in Spain, Sweden, Germany, and Greece as for the board of directors, present a low degree 
of compliance with the independence criteria developed in this study. 
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive statistics on the level of compliance to the corporate governance 
guidelines of independence of our European sample firms  
 
 
 
% of Compliance with local country 
codes of best practices 
% of Compliance according to 
independence criteria developed in this 
study 
Country N 
% 
Independent 
BOD 
%Audit 
committee 
independence 
CEO not 
Chairman 
% 
BOD 
Independence 
%Audit 
committee 
independence 
CEO not 
Chairman 
UK  143 94 96 97 94 100 97 
Ireland 10 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Denmark 12 50 92 100 50 92 92 
Netherland 26 58 100 100 92 100 100 
France 68 777 68 100 60 90 38 
Spain 21 71 100 100 48 76 57 
Greece 2 50 50 100 0 50 50 
Belgium 10 90 90 90 70 90 90 
Finland 17 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Sweden 28 100 100 96 61 79 96 
Norway 10 100 100 90 80 100 90 
Austria 6 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Portugal 4 100 100 100 25 100 100 
Luxembourg 3 100 100 67 100 100 67 
Germany 59 100 100 100 41 79 100 
Switzerland 31 100 100 100 90 93 87 
Italy 18 100 100 100 50 100 78 
 
Significant differences we observe also for the CEO/ Chairman compliance. As for the 
audit committee and the board of directors we observe that companies tend to comply more 
with their local best practices rather than the independence criteria of this study. For the 
CEO duality the question is if companies of the sample have the same person as CEO of 
the company and Chairman of the board of directors. As we observed many countries of 
the sample do not specify any recommendation regarding the division of duties between 
                                                          
7
 widely held= 79; controlled= 77 
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the CEO and Chairman so an explanation for the companies that fully comply with their 
best practices is because their best practices do not recommend the division of duties. Even 
though we observe a high degree of compliance of the companies with the local best 
practices, companies listed in countries such as Luxembourg, Norway and Belgium present 
a low degree of compliance compared to the other countries. This degree of compliance is 
lower for these countries if we observe the right section of the table. France, Spain and 
Greece have the lowest rate of CEO not being Chairman compared to other countries while 
companies listed in countries such as Ireland, Netherlands, Finland Austria, Portugal and 
Germany are fully compliant with the independence criteria developed in this study.  
Overall, we observe that Denmark and Netherlands have the lowest rate of compliance to 
their respective country codes. As for Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy, they have the 
lowest rate of independence according to the best practices of our model. If we compare 
this results with the classification of Table 1, except for Spain for the other three countries 
the result are also in line with the classification that we made, where we noted that the 
local best practices for these countries differ significantly with the best practices 
recommendations.  
Overall, the level of compliance of all our sample firms of all countries combines is 69 % 
for BOD independence, 91% for audit committee independence, 56% for the audit 
committee fully independent and 85 % for the Chairman’s independence as measured by 
the distinction (non-duality) of BOD Chair and CEO. These results are not reported in our 
Tables.  
These results are important to discuss the convergence of the corporate governance models 
for the European companies with the Anglo-Saxon best practices. According to these 
results we may say that at a firm level we observe that the corporate governance practices 
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of the European companies are converging towards a more independent mechanism of 
governance that is related to the Anglo-Saxon model.  The level of compliance of the 
companies with our measures of independence is high suggesting that convergence in the 
firm level of governance is actually occurring. Of particular interest is the audit committee 
fully independence. Although the best practices that we analyzed do not recommend it 
more than a half of the companies of our sample have a full independent audit committee. 
This contributes to our results suggesting that a convergence towards the Anglo-Saxon best 
practices is actually occurring. 
4.3 Measuring (T-test) how the proportion of independence is affected by the 
country’s legal regime and by the anti-director rights index (LaPorta et al., 1999)  
The last analysis consists in verifying whether our developed measure of independence 
criteria is consistent enough to capture corporate governance quality. To do this we use 
two different measures of classification to identify firms qualified as having strong or weak 
corporate governance systems; the legal regime and the level of anti-director rights 
(LaPorta et al. 1999) of the country in which they operate.  Numerous empirical studies 
have shown that an economy’s legal regime has a significant impact on its corporate 
governance practices and that common law countries have better corporate governance 
systems than civil law countries (Daske et al., 2006; Leuz et al., 2003; LaPorta et al., 
1998). According to La Porta et al.,1998 common low countries have strong investor 
protection compared to civil law countries and so also better corporate governance 
mechanisms. From this point of view we would expect that common law countries will 
also present more independent corporate governance board compared to the civil law 
countries. The authors also suggest that ownership concentration is negatively related to 
the level of investor protection of a country and civil law countries have more concentrated 
ownership structures compared to common law countries. Most of the European countries 
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are civil law and according to Enriques and Volpin (2007) most of the companies in 
Europe have a concentrated ownership structure. At this point being the independence a 
quality of strong corporate governance mechanism would be interesting to observe how the 
independence is related to the civil law countries of our study. As Kim et al., (2007) 
suggests in companies with large shareholders they can use their powers to expropriate the 
minority shareholders by appointing members to the board that are in line with their 
interests rather than independent members. In line with these studies we expect a small 
number of independent directors in the boards with concentrated ownership structure.  
The anti-director rights index developed in La Porta et al., (1998) represents an index of 
different variables that measure the shareholders’ rights. This index is used to determine 
the corporate governance quality of a firm according to the different variables of corporate 
governance that the index uses. In the other study La Porta et al.,(1999) classify countries 
according to the values of anti-director index. We use that classification in this study to see 
if our results also corroborate with the results of La Porta et al., (1999).   
Hence to validate our independence model, we classify our sample according to the 
countries’ legal regime and level of anti-director rights. We then perform T-tests on each 
of our three corporate governance measures (BOD independence, audit committee 
independence, and Chairman independence) according to these classifications to verify if 
there are significant differences found in the independence levels of the BOS, audit 
committee and the Chairman’s status. We report these results in Table 6.  
As seen in Table 6, the level of compliance to our independence measure is significantly 
higher for common law and High anti-director rights endowed firms for all three of our 
corporate governance variables. Common law countries present a more independent 
structure of corporate governance compared to the civil law countries. As other studies 
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suggest the ownership concentration and the level of investor protection may be some of 
the reason for these results. Our results are also in line with the anti-director index 
suggesting that strong corporate governance implies more independent members in the 
boards. Hence our developed measure of independence criteria is robust and corroborates 
with other metrics to capture the quality of corporate governance systems. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Mean Comparison (T-test) analysis of the proportion of BOD, audit committee and 
chairman’s independence according to the legal regime and anti-director rights. 
Legal Regime CIVIL LAW 
COMMOM 
LAW 
t Sig 
Prop BOD Independence ,58 ,93 -8,094 ,000 
Prop AUDIT COMMITTEE  
independence 
,87 ,99 -4,542 ,000 
% CEO  ≠ CHAIR ,79 ,97 -6,928 ,000 
La Porta et al.’s (1999) ranking 
of anti-director rights 
HIGH LOW t Sig 
Prop BOD Independence 0,59 0,85 -6,014 0 
Prop AUDIT COMMITTEE  
independence 
0,86 0,97 -4,017 0 
% CEO  ≠ CHAIR 0,81 0,92 -3,502 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Conclusions 
In this study, we explore and review the corporate governance mechanisms in Europe. We 
analyze the corporate governance best practices for 17 European countries. We focus our 
attention on the recommendations of the European corporate governance codes regarding 
the independence criteria. In particular we analyze the recommendations regarding the 
proportion of independent members in the board of directors, audit committee and the 
division of duties between the CEO and Chairman. Using a definition of independence 
developed by analyzing several national and international recent best practices we found 
useful results with regard to the country best practices recommendations and firm-level 
compliance with these recommendations.  
There are differences in the recommendations of the European corporate governance codes 
among the countries observed. We found that there are no countries using the same best 
practices among the sample. With regard to the CEO duality most of the countries 
recommend the division of duties between the CEO and Chairman. However, there are 
countries in which it is not recommended the division of duties between CEO and 
Chairman. 
When classifying the countries according to their corporate governance quality we 
observed that Anglo-Saxon countries such as Uk have a strong corporate governance 
compared to the other countries. For our classification Italy is the country with the weakest 
governance mechanisms followed by Switzerland. Comparing these results with La Porta 
et al., (1999) study we observe that our result are in line with their findings excluding 
Spain and Norway which in our classification they are not counted as having strong 
corporate governance. 
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By analyzing the recommendations of the corporate governance codes we observed that the 
definition of independence is different among the countries. Most of the countries adopt a 
definition that does not take into consideration the recommendations of international 
organisms such as the OECD or the EU commission. The main differences are related to 
the independence from the major shareholders for which most of the best practices do not 
recommend the proportion of a major shareholder or this principle is not recognized as a 
condition to determine the independence of a board member. For some European 
companies there was a misclassification of the board members as independent. According 
to the companies’ corporate governance reports these directors are classified as 
independent while according to our definition they are not. 
When analyzing the proportion of independent members in the board, audit committees 
and the division of duties between the CEO and Chairman we observed a high degree of 
independence for the companies of the sample. We show that companies tend to have more 
independent mechanisms of corporate governance than their best practices recommend. In 
line with our expectations Anglo-Saxon countries have more independent structures 
compared to the other countries. Interesting results we observed for the board of directors 
of Finish companies representing the highest degree of independence among the other 
countries, although their best practices do not recommend a majority of independent 
members in the board of directors. Germany is the country that presents less independent 
boards and audit committees compared to the other countries. A great incidence of these 
results is related to the presence of the employee representatives elected as members of 
these boards and not qualified as independent. 
Our findings show a high level of compliance of our sample firms to their respective 
corporate governance codes. When we measure the compliance with our definition of 
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independence, we note different results and the degree of compliance decreases 
significantly for some countries of our sample.  
Nevertheless, in general, our sample firms exhibit a high level of compliance to our 
developed independence criteria. This is interesting to note because although the measure 
of independence that we used to determine the independence of the members is stricter 
compared to the countries’ best practices we observe that most of the companies tend to 
comply with these recommendations. It seems that in order to increase the number of 
investors and also the financing from new international investors, European companies 
have adopted principles that are widely accepted by international investors. Interesting to 
note is the audit committee fully independence. Even though the best practices do not 
recommend a fully independent audit committee more than a half of the sample tend to 
comply with this principle.  
Classifying our sample between common and civil law countries and with LaPorta et al.’s 
(1999) ranking of countries according to the level of anti-director rights, we find that firms 
operating in common law countries and having high anti-director rights exhibit a 
significantly higher degree of independence compared to firms in civil law countries and 
with low anti-director rights. 
The overall results of our sample of firms suggest a high compliance of the companies with 
the Anglo-Saxon best practices. This is documented by the number of companies with fully 
independent audit committee but also the high degree of independent audit committees and 
the CEO not being a Chairman. As the measure of independence that we used has 
similarities with the Anglo-Saxon countries this brings us to the conclusion that civil law 
countries are adopting more shareholder oriented structures similar to Anglo-Saxon best 
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practices. Thus we document that corporate governance practices are converging and this 
convergence is moving towards the Anglo-Saxon best practices of corporate governance. 
Contributions and limitations 
This research contributes to the literature in many ways. It documents the recent corporate 
governance practices in Europe and in particular their recommendations on the 
independence criteria of the board members. We gather firm level statistics on the 
independence of boards, audit committees and the chairman’s independence from 
management, on a large sample of European firms from 17 different countries, to 
understand how the firms comply with their respective governance guidelines and also 
with the measure of independence that we developed in this study. Because many 
differences are observed in the definition of independence from one country to another, we 
developed our own definition of independence inspired by the strictest criteria found in the 
governance code of the countries studied as well as by the SEC, OECD and European 
commission recommendations. The independence criteria developed in this study allows us 
to contribute to the existing studies by proposing a new set of standardized guidelines in 
defining the independence criteria for board members and audit committees.  
Using our definition of independence we show that countries tend to comply with their 
respective country codes but also show a high level of compliance with the measures of 
independence that we used in this study. Because the study shows that the level of 
compliance of firms in terms of BOD and audit committee independence as well as 
Chairman’s independence is higher in Common Law countries with stronger enforced 
corporate governance systems, corporate governance standards and codes setters of Civil 
Law countries can be inspired by this research to enforce their actual guidelines in regards 
to the independence criteria, and therefore attract more international investors. 
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The sample we used composed of small, medium and large firms allows us to better 
generalize the results as most of the studies use only large firms. Using only large firms 
may have negative impact on the sample as large firms are more oriented towards adopting 
more international best practices of corporate governance. 
In this study we also contribute to the existing literature analyzing the convergence of the 
European corporate governance practices. Analyzing the corporate governance codes but 
also the corporate governance reports of the companies of the sample we are able to 
determine the degree of convergence of the European corporate governance practices in a 
firm-level and country-level. We document a high degree of adoption of the governance 
practices in a firm-level but still differences in a country-level corporate governance 
practices suggesting convergence in the firm-level. This suggests a convergence of the 
European corporate governance practices towards the Anglo-Saxon practices of corporate 
governance.  
However, this study presents some limits. The sample is large enough to analyze the 
convergence and the corporate governance practices of the European companies but the 
sample is not equally distributed among the countries. For some countries the number of 
companies is very low and this makes difficult to generalize the results on the governance 
practices of these countries.  
Another limit of the study is related to the proportion of cross-listed companies and their 
incidence in the sample selected. Cross-listed companies may be more willing to adopt 
governance practices that are commonly accepted in all the countries they are cross-listed 
and this may play an important role in their improvements of corporate governance or in 
their degree of adoption of the Anglo-Saxon best practices being this best practices 
commonly accepted worldwide. 
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We focused our attention in explaining the convergence of the corporate governance 
practices but also the quality of the governance by only using the independence criteria. 
Analyzing all the recommendations of the codes of best practices may be more useful to 
compare the governance quality of the countries and also more important in determining 
convergence. 
Future research venues 
As we documented in this study there is a high level of compliance of the companies of the 
sample with the Anglo-Saxon best practices. We suggest that future research should be 
focused in explaining the reasons of the high compliance of the European companies with 
the Anglo-Saxon best practices even though their best practices do not recommend a high 
level of independence. Studies should be focusing in the incidence of the international 
investors on improving the corporate governance systems and so moving towards a more 
shareholder oriented mechanism such as the Anglo-Saxon model. As Zattoni and Cuomo 
(2008) suggest the Anglo-Saxon investors may put pressure to the firms to adopt more 
shareholder oriented mechanisms of governance and so more independent structures that 
are important in protecting the shareholders’ interests. At this point would be interesting to 
analyze the incidence that these investors may have in improving corporate governance 
mechanisms in the European companies. 
When analyzing the governance practices among the European countries we found that 
their best practices are different in the recommendations of the proportion of independence 
in the board and the division of duties between the CEO and Chairman. We documented 
convergence in the firm level and this convergence according to Gilson (2001) is in form 
rather than functional. The convergence is in form because we noted that companies tend 
to follow the Anglo-Saxon principles of governance. However, we didn’t analyze if this 
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new practices improve the governance of the companies. The main objective of corporate 
governance is to mitigate the agency problems and also improve the company 
performance.  New studies may focus on these results and analyze their impact in 
mitigating the agency problems and increasing the value of the firm.  
Studies have been controversial in analyzing the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. We found that the number of independent members 
differs from that disclosed by the companies. Using these results to analyze the role of 
independent directors in improving company performance may bring new results and so 
contribute to the existing literature on firm performance by suggesting new measures to 
determine the independence of the board members.    
Finally, we hope our study inspires future research in corporate governance to further 
develop corporate governance quality measures. 
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Table 1 
Proportion of independent members in the Board of directors for each company  
Country 
Prop BOD 
indep 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage 
Denmark 
.29 1 8.3 
.33 2 16.7 
.42 1 8.3 
.44 2 16.7 
.56 2 16.7 
.57 1 8.3 
.58 2 16.7 
.67 1 8.3 
Total 12 100.0 
Finland 
.57 1 5.9 
.67 2 11.8 
.75 1 5.9 
.82 1 5.9 
.86 4 23.5 
.88 2 11.8 
.89 1 5.9 
1.00 5 29.4 
Total 17 100.0 
France 
.17 1 1.5 
.19 1 1.5 
.22 1 1.5 
.23 1 1.5 
.25 3 4.4 
.27 1 1.5 
.28 1 1.5 
.30 1 1.5 
.31 1 1.5 
.33 3 4.4 
.36 1 1.5 
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.40 4 5.9 
.42 2 2.9 
.42 1 1.5 
.43 1 1.5 
.44 2 2.9 
.45 1 1.5 
.47 1 1.5 
.50 5 7.4 
.53 1 1.5 
.53 1 1.5 
.55 2 2.9 
.56 1 1.5 
.57 1 1.5 
.58 3 4.4 
.59 1 1.5 
.60 1 1.5 
.62 1 1.5 
.63 1 1.5 
.64 2 2.9 
.64 4 5.9 
.67 1 1.5 
.71 1 1.5 
.73 1 1.5 
.75 4 5.9 
.77 1 1.5 
.80 2 2.9 
.81 1 1.5 
.82 3 4.4 
.83 1 1.5 
.86 1 1.5 
1.00 1 1.5 
Total 68 100.0 
Germany 
.00 1 1.7 
.10 2 3.4 
.11 1 1.7 
.13 1 1.7 
.15 1 1.7 
.22 1 1.7 
.25 4 6.8 
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.30 1 1.7 
.33 1 1.7 
.35 1 1.7 
.38 1 1.7 
.40 5 8.5 
.42 10 16.9 
.43 1 1.7 
.44 4 6.8 
.50 17 28.8 
.67 4 6.8 
.83 2 3.4 
1.00 1 1.7 
Total 59 100.0 
Uk 
.38 1 .7 
.40 2 1.4 
.43 1 .7 
.44 1 .7 
.45 1 .7 
.46 2 1.4 
.50 9 6.3 
.53 1 .7 
.54 1 .7 
.55 4 2.8 
.56 8 5.6 
.57 12 8.4 
.58 4 2.8 
.60 7 4.9 
.62 1 .7 
.63 13 9.1 
.64 3 2.1 
.64 1 .7 
.67 22 15.4 
.69 1 .7 
.69 1 .7 
.70 8 5.6 
.71 9 6.3 
.73 5 3.5 
.73 1 .7 
.75 5 3.5 
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.77 1 .7 
.78 10 7.0 
.80 2 1.4 
.82 1 .7 
.83 2 1.4 
.86 1 .7 
.92 1 .7 
1.00 1 .7 
Total 143 100.0 
Greece 
.27 1 50.0 
.42 1 50.0 
Total 2 100.0 
Ireland 
.50 1 10.0 
.60 2 20.0 
.62 1 10.0 
.64 1 10.0 
.67 1 10.0 
.69 1 10.0 
.75 1 10.0 
.89 1 10.0 
.92 1 10.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Italy 
.00 1 5.6 
.20 1 5.6 
.23 1 5.6 
.33 3 16.7 
.40 1 5.6 
.44 1 5.6 
.47 1 5.6 
.50 1 5.6 
.53 1 5.6 
.55 1 5.6 
.56 1 5.6 
.60 2 11.1 
.64 1 5.6 
.67 1 5.6 
.78 1 5.6 
Total 18 100.0 
Louxembourg .50 1 33.3 
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.56 1 33.3 
.70 1 33.3 
Total 3 100.0 
Netherlands 
.36 1 3.8 
.40 1 3.8 
.50 1 3.8 
.62 1 3.8 
.67 1 3.8 
.70 1 3.8 
.71 1 3.8 
.75 1 3.8 
.78 1 3.8 
.83 3 11.5 
.86 2 7.7 
1.00 12 46.2 
Total 26 100.0 
Norway 
.40 1 10.0 
.42 1 10.0 
.50 1 10.0 
.63 1 10.0 
.64 1 10.0 
.70 2 20.0 
.71 1 10.0 
.83 1 10.0 
1.00 1 10.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Portugal 
.12 1 25.0 
.33 2 50.0 
.53 1 25.0 
Total 4 100.0 
Spain 
.11 1 4.8 
.20 1 4.8 
.25 1 4.8 
.27 1 4.8 
.27 1 4.8 
.31 1 4.8 
.33 1 4.8 
.36 1 4.8 
.38 1 4.8 
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.42 1 4.8 
.44 1 4.8 
.50 2 9.5 
.53 2 9.5 
.56 1 4.8 
.60 1 4.8 
.62 1 4.8 
.64 1 4.8 
.79 1 4.8 
.88 1 4.8 
Total 21 100.0 
Sweden 
.25 2 7.1 
.27 1 3.6 
.28 1 3.6 
.33 1 3.6 
.36 1 3.6 
.36 1 3.6 
.40 1 3.6 
.42 2 7.1 
.43 1 3.6 
.50 3 10.7 
.57 2 7.1 
.58 2 7.1 
.60 1 3.6 
.63 2 7.1 
.64 2 7.1 
.67 1 3.6 
.73 2 7.1 
.75 1 3.6 
.88 1 3.6 
Total 28 100.0 
Switzerland 
.29 1 3.2 
.38 1 3.2 
.43 1 3.2 
.50 1 3.2 
.55 2 6.5 
.57 1 3.2 
.60 2 6.5 
.63 2 6.5 
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.67 2 6.5 
.70 1 3.2 
.75 3 9.7 
.78 3 3.2 
.79 1 3.2 
.80 1 3.2 
.83 1 3.2 
.87 1 3.2 
.90 1 3.2 
.91 2 6.5 
.92 1 3.2 
.92 1 3.2 
1.00 4 12.9 
Total 33 100.0 
Austria 
.53 1 16.7 
.54 1 16.7 
.58 1 16.7 
.62 1 16.7 
.82 1 16.7 
.83 1 16.7 
Total 6 100.0 
Belgium 
.22 1 10.0 
.33 1 10.0 
.36 1 10.0 
.50 3 30.0 
.56 1 10.0 
.56 1 10.0 
.58 1 10.0 
.83 1 10.0 
Total 10 100.0 
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Table 2 
Proportion of independent members in the audit committee for each company  
Contry Prop AUD indep 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage 
Denmark 
.29 1 8.3 
.50 1 8.3 
.67 6 50.0 
1.00 4 33.3 
Total 12 100.0 
Finland 
.67 1 6.3 
.75 1 6.3 
1.00 15 87.5 
Total 17 100.0 
France 
.20 1 1.5 
.25 2 2.9 
.33 4 5.9 
.50 9 13.2 
.60 6 8.8 
.67 21 30.9 
.71 1 1.5 
.75 4 5.9 
.80 2 2.9 
1.00 18 26.5 
Total 68 100.0 
Germany 
.00 3 5.2 
.20 1 1.7 
.25 2 3.4 
.33 4 6.9 
.40 2 3.4 
.50 35 60.3 
.60 3 5.2 
.67 4 6.9 
.75 2 3.4 
1.00 3 3.4 
Total 59 100.0 
Uk .50 1 .7 
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.67 3 2.1 
.75 1 .7 
.83 1 .7 
1.00 137 95.8 
Total 143 100.0 
Greece 
.33 1 50.0 
1.00 1 50.0 
Total 2 100.0 
Ireland 
.71 1 10.0 
1.00 9 90.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Italy 
.67 1 20.0 
1.00 17 80.0 
 Total 18 100.0 
Luxembourg 
.67 1 33.3 
1.00 2 66.7 
Total 3 100.0 
Netherlands 
.50 3 11.5 
.67 2 7.7 
.75 1 3.8 
1.00 20 76.9 
Total 26 100.0 
Norway 
.67 3 30.0 
.75 1 10.0 
1.00 6 60.0 
Total 10 100.0 
Portugal 
.67 1 33.3 
1.00 3 66.7 
Total 4 100.0 
Spain 
.20 1 4.8 
.33 3 14.3 
.40 1 4.8 
.50 1 4.8 
.60 4 19.0 
.67 3 14.3 
.75 2 9.5 
.83 1 4.8 
1.00 5 23.8 
Total 21 100.0 
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Sweden 
.25 1 3.6 
.33 5 17.9 
.50 2 7.1 
.60 1 3.6 
.67 7 25.0 
.75 1 3.6 
.80 1 3.6 
1.00 10 35.7 
Total 28 100.0 
Switzerland 
.25 1 3.4 
.33 1 3.4 
.50 5 17.2 
.67 5 24.1 
1.00 15 51.7 
 Total 27 100.0 
Austria 
.50 4 66.7 
.67 2 33.3 
Total 6 100.0 
Belgium 
.33 1 10.0 
.50 1 10.0 
.60 1 10.0 
.67 1 10.0 
.75 2 20.0 
1.00 4 40.0 
Total 10 100.0 
